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Introduction
One of the basic assumptions of standard economic theory is that individuals’ beha-
vior is solely guided by the quest for the highest possible material outcome. However,
there is ample evidence of additional factors influencing individuals’ behavior as well.
Besides individual-specific factors, also external factors and the corresponding inter-
actions between both kinds of factors have been shown to affect decision making in
various contexts (e.g., Andreoni 1989, Hoffman et al. 1994, Liberman et al. 1994,
Park 2000, Fehr & Gächter 2002, Falk & Fischbacher 2006, Kube et al. 2012, Falk &
Szech 2013). As the selected studies indicate, social preferences like altruism, fairness
or reciprocity belong to the major individual-specific factors, while both the design
of institutions and the framing of situations constitute prominent external factors.
In three self-contained essays, this thesis aims at empirically exploring potential
deviations from the standard economic model that, due to at least one of the factors
mentioned above, may arise in three frequently occuring environments. Chapter 1
analyzes a situation which consumers are nowadays quite familiar with. Instead
of selling their products independently, an increasing number of companies attach
public good components to their standard private goods, thus creating a new product
category referred to as hybrid bundles. Prominent examples include green electricity
or products that go along with a donation to a social cause. Given that consumers
could also replicate such a hybrid bundle by acquiring its components separately,
Chapter 1 investigates with the help of laboratory experiments whether and how
individuals’ valuation of both components is affected by the presentation format.
Chapter 2 deals with job promotions within firms. In contrast to the majority
of the existing literature, this chapter takes into account that promotions are usu-
ally not viewed as an end in themselves but rather as the start of a new phase of
interaction between promoted and non-promoted individuals, which is subject to the
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new hierarchy. Based on this extended notion of promotions, this chapter evaluates
both empirically and theoretically whether employee behavior during and after the
tournament is affected by the design of a firm’s promotion scheme. To this aim,
the two most important promotion schemes of vertical and lateral promotions are
compared.
Chapter 3 investigates leadership in social dilemmas. With the help of laboratory
experiments it tests whether leadership behavior and leadership effectiveness are
affected by the institutional framing. The framing is accomplished by exposing
individuals to a social dilemma either in the form of a give-some or a take-some
game. The corresponding analyses do not only provide insights with respect to the
behavior of leaders but also with respect to the contribution plans of followers, which
had been neglected in the literature so far.
The three chapters are summarized in the following in more detail. Chapter 1
explores whether individual valuations of private and public goods are affected by
the format in which they are presented.1 More precisely, given that an increas-
ing number of companies try to make their feeling of social responsibility visible
by attaching public good components to their products, we analyze whether these
bundles of private and public goods affect individuals’ valuations. According to stan-
dard economic theory, a consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a combination of
two goods should stay unaffected by bundling since it does not change the goods’
inherent characteristics (see, e.g., Adams & Yellen 1976, Jehiel et al. 2007). By con-
trast, we identify several channels that may also cause a different valuation. In light
of this tension, we are the first to use laboratory experiments to empirically test for a
possible effect of hybrid bundling. To this aim, we elicit subjects’ WTP for a private
and a public good with an adaptation of the Becker, DeGroot & Marschak method
(1964) and vary between treatments whether both goods are offered separately or in
the form of a bundle. To further assess whether a potential effect of bundling depends
on the nature of the goods bundled, we conduct two additional control treatments
in which the public good is replaced with a comparable private good.
Our data document superadditivity for hybrid bundles, i.e., the WTP for the
hybrid bundle exceeds the WTP for the separately offered private and public good.
1This chapter is joint work with Gert Pönitzsch (Frackenpohl & Pönitzsch 2013).
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By contrast, we find no superadditivity if two private goods are bundled. These
findings seem to be driven by spillovers from the public to the private good and by
an extended warm glow from self-signalling. More generally, the superadditivity in
the evaluation of hybrid bundles shows that, depending on the nature of the goods,
individuals may indeed react to the way in which products are presented. Markets
may therefore play a strong role in the provision of public goods, which should in
particular encourage charitable organizations to seek cooperations with the private
sector. At the same time, the data also provide an explanation for the increasing use
of measures of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), as CSR may create benefits
for firms by inducing a different perception and use of their products.
Chapter 2 studies a largely neglected aspect of promotion tournaments in firms,
which consists in the fact that they typically do not occur in isolation but are followed
by interaction between promoted and non-promoted individuals.2 Acknowledging the
relevance of this multi-stage nature of promotions, I investigate both empirically and
theoretically whether the design of job promotions is able to affect employee beha-
vior in at least one of the corresponding stages. I therefore compare the two most
important promotion schemes within firms, i.e., vertical and lateral promotions. The
main difference between these promotion schemes consists in whether or not indivi-
duals compete against the same person they are later required to cooperate with.
Under vertical promotions opponents continue to interact with each other after the
tournament according to the newly established hierarchy. By contrast, under late-
ral promotions a promoted individual always encounters a non-promoted individual
she has not faced in the previous tournament. In the laboratory, I implement both
promotion schemes as a tournament with binary sabotage, which is followed by a
gift-exchange game in which tournament winners take the role of the principal and
tournament losers that of the agent. Although standard economic theory would not
predict any behavioral differences between both treatments, the opposite may hold
true in the presence of social preferences since in particular reciprocal preferences
may be more relevant under vertical promotions (see, e.g., Grund & Sliwka 2005).
In line with a model of action-based reciprocity (see, e.g., Cox et al. 2007), I find
significant treatment differences with respect to tournament behavior. In particular,
2This chapter is based on sole-authored work.
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subjects refrain more often from sabotage under the vertical promotion scheme. By
contrast, subjects’ behavior in the subsequent gift-exchange game is similar. An
additional control treatment, which consists of the gift-exchange stage only, reveals
that competitive experience seems to have no effect on cooperation. These findings
demonstrate that job promotions may affect employee behavior and in particular
mitigate sabotage, which usually constitutes a major drawback of tournaments (e.g.,
Chen 2005, Harbring et al. 2007, Falk et al. 2008). My results suggest that it may
be attractive for firms and other organizations to rely on vertical instead of lateral
promotions when designing career paths.
Chapter 3 focuses on leadership in social dilemmas, a topic that recently has
attracted much interest among researchers.3 Given that previous work has investi-
gated leadership mainly in positively framed social dilemmas (e.g., Gächter & Renner
2004, Güth et al. 2007, Haigner &Wakolbinger 2010, Rivas & Sutter 2011), we are the
first to empirically analyze behavior in social dilemmas with first-moving leaders in a
unified framework. More precisely, we compare subjects’ behavior in a give-some and
a take-some game with leadership. An additional novel feature of our work consists
in the implementation of the strategy method in this environment to cleanly elicit
followers’ behavior at the individual level and compare it between frames. With the
help of these two features we analyze whether leadership behavior and in particular
leadership effectiveness are affected by the institutional frame.
Our data confirm that leaders’ behavior, followers’ reactions and the effectiveness
of the leadership institution are strongly influenced by the institutional frame. With
the help of the strategy method we even find evidence for the malleability of followers’
cooperation types. Compared to the take-frame, significantly more followers act
like conditional cooperators and significantly less followers act like free riders in
the give-frame. Leaders seem to anticipate this difference in followers’ behavior
and contribute less themselves in the take-frame, leading to considerably higher
social efficiency in the give-frame. These findings suggest that, in particular when a
leadership mechanism is in place, policy makers might want to set the institutional
frame such that it addresses the positive aspects of behavior (“Do something good!”)
rather than focuses on the negative ones (“Do not do something bad!”).
3This chapter is joint work with Adrian Hillenbrand and Sebastian Kube.
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Chapter 1
Bundling Public with Private Goods
1.1 Introduction
Public goods, such as clean air, education, and culture, constitute an important
ingredient of social welfare. Their provision by regional authorities is, however,
often hindered by asymmetric information with respect to the valuation of the public
goods. Charities evolved to fill this breach but typically have problems raising funds.
Therefore, increasing the voluntary provision of public goods remains a crucial task.
This chapter introduces a new mechanism that may increase private contributions
to public goods. More precisely, we show in this chapter that bundling a public good
with a private good induces superadditivity. That means, offering a private good
and a public good as a bundle, i.e., as a single product, may increase consumers’
valuation for the combination of both goods relative to the case in which they are
offered separately. An illustrative example for such a bundle is a carbon neutral
flight, as it combines a flight, a private good, with a carbon offset, which constitutes
a contribution to the public good of climate change mitigation.1 Other examples
in which a private good is bundled with a public good or, equivalently, features
public good characteristics, include ecotourism, sustainably fished seafood, or green
electricity.
1Since contributions to public goods fulfill the defining characteristics of a public good (i.e.,
non-excludability and non-rivalry), we use the terms ‘contribution to a public good’ and ‘public
good’ interchangeably.
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Standard consumer theory assumes that bundling two goods does not affect con-
sumers’ valuations for the bundle’s parts (e.g., Adams & Yellen 1976, Jehiel et al.
2007, Armstrong & Vickers 2010). However, several behavioral concepts suggest that
a decision maker may exhibit a different valuation for two goods if they are bundled.
For example, the presentation of two goods as a bundle can decrease the salience of
the bundled goods and lead to lower valuations for the combination of both goods
(e.g., Rottenstreich & Tversky 1997, Bernasconi et al. 2009). Bundling may also
affect the way in which consumers aggregate information about the bundled goods’
attributes and therefore influence their valuations (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, An-
derson 1981).
The literature on the evaluation of bundles has so far focused exclusively on
bundles of either only private or only public goods. The key contribution of this
chapter is to show, based on different behavioral concepts and experimental data,
that bundles of public and private goods are special in the way they are evaluated.
More precisely, we argue that a consumer’s evaluation of such a bundle, which we call
hybrid bundle, is subject to specific behavioral channels that are absent for bundles
of only private or only public goods.2
One of those channels are spillovers from one good to another. It is well established
that cues like the brand name can affect the perception of a good’s quality (see the
review of Lee et al. 2006). However, also items bundled to a good may either directly
hint at the value of the good (Popkowski Leszczyc et al. 2008) or reveal informa-
tion about the selling firm’s trustworthiness in providing good quality and caring
about customer needs (Siegel & Vitaliano 2007). Since public goods are positively
connoted, they are likely to induce positive inferences about the associated private
good in a hybrid bundle. For example, many people conjecture that fair trade food
is organic, although the label “Fair Trade” only guarantees compliance with require-
ments on working conditions and employee remuneration. Consumers have also been
shown to like the taste of a milk shake better if it is labelled as organic (Linder 2011).
Also consumers’ desire for a positive self-image (e.g., Brekke et al. 2003, Bénabou
2Other research suggested the term ‘impure public good’ for a combination of public and private
goods. However, this term is also used for goods that exhibit either excludability or rivalry in
consumption. To avoid confusion, we instead use the term ‘hybrid bundle’ to capture that a pure
public good, whose consumption is non-excludable and non-rival, is combined with a private good,
whose consumption is excludable and rival.
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& Tirole 2006) can affect their valuations. If a public good is bundled with a durable
private good, the use of the latter can remind the consumer of the good deed she
performed. The warm glow stemming from the good deed (Andreoni 1989, 1990) can
in this way be extended to the duration of use of the private good. A sophisticated
consumer anticipates the additional future utility that the hybrid bundle generates
and thus exhibits a higher valuation for the bundle. More concretely, a driver of a
hybrid car may experience warm glow whenever using the car. The purchase of a
carbon offset, in contrast, does not feature the advantage of continuously reminding
the consumer of her character.
These and other channels that we discuss in this chapter predict that bundling
public and private goods increases the valuation for the combination of the two
goods. Nonetheless, it remains an empirical question whether hybrid bundling affects
consumer valuations strongly enough to be of economic relevance. Since clean data
that allow for a test of superadditivity in hybrid bundles can hardly be obtained in
the field, we investigate this question in the controlled environment of a laboratory
experiment.
In a between-subjects design, we analyze the effect of hybrid bundling on indi-
viduals’ valuations. In the spirit of the method introduced by Becker, DeGroot
& Marschak (1964), subjects receive an endowment and make a series of purchase
decisions in which they face different prices for the two goods. At the end of the ex-
periment one of the choice situations is randomly drawn to be payoff relevant. From
subjects’ choices we obtain their willingness to pay (WTP) for the offered goods.
In the Separate treatment, both a private good (a cup) and a public good (a e2
donation to charity) can be purchased separately, while in the Bundle treatment
the public good is only available in the form of a bundle with the private good.
Two control treatments, in which the public good is replaced by a private good (a
e2 voucher for an online store), further examine whether the effect of bundling on
subjects’ WTP depends on the nature (public vs. private) of the bundled goods.
We find that subjects exhibit a significantly higher valuation for the hybrid bundle
than for the combination of both goods when sold separately. Individuals’ willingness
to pay for the hybrid bundle, on average, exceeds that for the separately offered goods
by more than 60%, revealing a strong superadditivity evoked by hybrid bundling.
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Moreover, we do not observe superadditivity when bundling two private goods. Thus,
the nature of the bundled goods seems to play a decisive role for the effect of bundling
on valuations.
The strong increase in the WTP documented in our experiment suggests size-
able economic effects of hybrid bundling. In particular, our data indicate that
bundling can help to increase the provision of public goods. Some charities already
use private goods to encourage donations. For example, the World Wide Fund for
Nature (WWF) promotes animal adoptions with an ‘adoption kit’ that contains a
stuffed animal. Similarly, the Lance Armstrong Foundation uses the profits from the
sale of Livestrong apparel in the fight against cancer.
Our results also provide a potential explanation for the recent increase in Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (CSR) measures, since companies linking social activities
to the sales of their products effectively offer hybrid bundles.3 For example, the
Danone group promised to provide 10 liters of drinking water in African countries
for each liter of Volvic mineral water sold. Similarly, IKEA ties a $1 donation to
purchases of child related products in its annual Christmas campaigns. Our data
suggest that firms may benefit from CSR because it induces a different perception
and use of their products, allowing firms to pass on the costs of the public good and
to still increase sales.4
The superadditivity in the evaluation of hybrid bundles, conceptualized and em-
pirically documented in this chapter, is a useful building block for the explanation
of these phenomena. It is worth noting that, in principle, all market participants
may gain from hybrid bundling and the resulting superadditivity. How consumers’
augmented valuation is split up between consumers on the one hand and firms and
the social cause on the other hand is ultimately determined by the market structure.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, we describe the
design of our experiment. The main behavioral predictions are derived in Section 1.3.
Section 1.4 reports the results of our experiment. Further channels that may affect
3The European Commission defines CSR as a “concept whereby companies integrate social
and environmental concerns in their business operations [...] on a voluntary basis” (European
Commission 2001).
4Other explanations of firms’ engagement in public good provision rely on complementarity
between private and non-marketed public goods (Heal 2003) as well as on firms’ altruism and their
desire to avoid pressure from interest groups (Baron 2001).
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consumers’ valuation for a hybrid bundle in the field are discussed in Section 1.5.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of our findings and suggestions for future
research in Section 1.6.
1.2 Experimental Design
Central to our experiment is the comparison of subjects’ willingness to pay for a
public and a private good when both goods are sold either as a bundle or separately.
We elicit subjects’ WTPs by offering the goods at varying prices and observing
subjects’ purchase decisions. To control for effects of bundling that are independent
of the type of the bundled goods, we perform the same analysis also with two private
goods.
In this section, we first present the goods used in the experiment and sketch the
basic structure of the conducted treatments. Subsequently we discuss the treatments
and the elicitation of subjects’ WTPs in more detail. We conclude this section with
a description of the experimental procedures.
1.2.1 Goods
In the main condition (Public), subjects are offered a private and a public good.
We use a cup as the private good because the benefits of possessing the cup mainly
accrue to the cup holder. As the public good, we use a donation of e2 to a nationally
renowned charity providing help for children in need. The services provided by the
charity, such as improved health care and education, generate non-excludable and
non-rival benefits to the society and thus fulfill the characteristics of a public good.5
Upon purchase of the donation, the experimenters donate e2 to the charity, while
subjects pay the respective purchase price. Thus, the objective value of the public
good is fixed, while its price can be altered.
In the control condition (Private), we consider bundling of two private goods.
As the first private good we use the same cup as in the Public condition. The
second private good is a voucher for an online store denominated at e2. This choice
5The notion that services provided by charities constitute public goods is also applied in, e.g.,
Andreoni (1990), Glazer & Konrad (1996) and Elfenbein et al. (2012).
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of goods keeps the level and the salience of the goods’ objective values constant
across conditions.
1.2.2 Treatments
The experiment consists of two conditions, Public and Private, that differ in the
available goods. In each condition, two treatments capture the effect of bundling in a
between-subjects design. While the two goods are available separately in the Sepa-
rate treatments, the donation or voucher is bundled with the cup in the Bundle
treatments. For an increased comparability between treatments, the cup is available
as a distinct product in the Bundle treatment as well. The resulting 2x2 design is
depicted in Table 2.3.
Table 1.1: Treatments
Treatment 1st good on offer 2nd good on offer Observations6
Public-Separate cup donation 44
Public-Bundle cup cup with donation 32
Private-Separate cup voucher 37
Private-Bundle cup cup with voucher 42
1.2.3 Elicitation of Valuations
For each condition, our aim is to compare participants’ willingness to pay for the
combination of two goods between the Separate and the Bundle treatment. The
standard approach for an incentive compatible elicitation of a WTP goes back to
Becker, DeGroot & Marschak (1964). We adapt this method so that it can determine
individual valuations for two goods at a time.7 Participants receive an endowment of
e10 and make purchase decisions in various choice situations, all featuring different
prices for the two goods on offer. At the end of the experiment, one of these situa-
tions is randomly drawn to determine a subject’s payment. The respective purchase
6The sample is unbalanced because of no-shows and subjects that failed to answer the post-
experimental control questions correctly (see Section 1.2.4 and Appendix A.2).
7For a detailed explanation of the restrictions of the standard BDM method in our setting see
the end of this section.
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decision is then implemented, i.e., the subject receives the purchased goods if she
intended to buy any, and the corresponding prices are deducted from her endowment.
In the following we describe the purchase options in the Separate and the
Bundle treatment in more detail. For simplicity, we focus on the Public condition,
but all explanations hold analogously for the Private condition. As the choice
situation in Table 1.2 illustrates, the Separate treatment replicates the standard
environment that consumers generally face: a private and a public good are available
separately, and the consumer can decide for each good whether she wants to buy it or
not. Hence, in every choice situation a subject has four options: a) buying nothing,
b) buying the private and the public good, c) buying only the private good, or
d) buying only the public good.
Table 1.2: Choice situation, treatment Public-Separate
situation cup donation
no. 19 price: e0.50 price: e1
O buy O don’t buy O buy O don’t buy
In the Bundle treatment the public good is offered in a bundle with the private
good. In addition, to increase the comparability with the Separate treatment, the
private good can also be purchased on its own. Thus, as the choice situation in
Table 1.3 illustrates, subjects in the Bundle treatment choose between a) buying
nothing, b) buying the bundle of the private and the public good, and c) buying
only the private good. Also this setting is familiar to subjects since they often
choose between similar products, of which one has the additional feature of ensuring
contributions to a public good.
Table 1.3: Choice situation, treatment Public-Bundle
situation cup cup with donation nothing
no. 19 price: e0.50 price: e1.50
O buy O buy O buy nothing
Our design allows to elicit valuations for the combination of both goods, for the
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cup, and for the donation. To elicit these valuations, all choice situations differ
with respect to the prices of the offered goods. More precisely, the price of the cup
varies in steps of e0.50 between e0 and e3.50, whereas the price of the donation
varies in steps of e0.20 between e0 and e2.40. Every possible combination of cup
and donation price constitutes one choice situation, yielding a total of 104 situations.
The price intervals cover a broad range of possible valuations, but keep the number of
required decisions manageable. The choice situations are ordered lexicographically,
first with respect to the cup price and second with respect to the donation price. In
the Bundle treatment, the price of the bundle equals the sum of the cup and the
donation price.8
From subjects’ decisions we derive measures for their valuation for the different
goods. In both treatments we use the highest total price at which a subject acquired
both goods (i.e., chose option b) as a measure of her WTP for both goods. Likewise,
we obtain a measure of the WTP for the cup from the highest cup price at which a
subject bought the cup exclusively (i.e., chose option c).9 As a consistent measure
of the valuation for the donation, we use the highest premium subjects tolerate
to obtain the donation in addition to the cup. Table 1.4 again summarizes these
different measures and their elicitation.
Table 1.4: Elicitation of valuations in the Public condition10
Measure Separate Bundle
WTP for the cup
and the donation
highest total price at which both
goods are bought (option b)
highest price at which the
bundle is bought (option b)
WTP for the cup highest price of the cup at which it is bought exclusively (option c)
premium for the
donation at a given
cup price
highest price of the donation at
which it is bought along with
the cup (option b)
highest surcharge accepted to
obtain the bundle instead of the
cup alone (option b)
To test for superadditivity induced by hybrid bundling, we compare subjects’
8Instructions and screenshots can be found in Appendix A.2 and A.3.
9In some cases, subjects in the Bundle treatment always preferred a purchase of the bundle
to a purchase of the cup alone. Then, we cannot determine the WTP for the cup and set it to
zero. The measure of the WTP for the cup is thus likely to be biased downward in the Bundle
treatment. However, this does not change our findings qualitatively.
10All measures are obtained analogously in the Private condition.
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WTP for the combination of both goods between the Separate and the Bundle
treatment. This way, our results are not influenced by complementarity or substitu-
tability between the goods. The valuation for the single goods may provide additional
insights into the driving forces behind potential valuation differences.
Having outlined the design of our experiment, we would like to point out some
noteworthy aspects of our novel approach of eliciting the WTP for two goods at a
time. First of all, it incorporates the most important features of the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) method (1964) for the elicitation of WTPs, as for example the ran-
dom draw of the final price. For our purposes, however, the standard BDM method
cannot be applied separately to measure the WTP for two goods. This would require
the random draw of two prices, which leaves two options for the timing of their reve-
lation. On the one hand, revealing the drawn prices only after choices for both goods
have been made leaves the subject uninformed about whether she obtained the first
good when deciding about the purchase of the second good. In this case, not only
the uncertainty about the remaining endowment but also substitutability or comple-
mentarity between the goods could bias the obtained WTPs. On the other hand,
revealing the price draw for the first good before eliciting the WTP for the second
good may render the WTP for the second good uncomparable between subjects. The
reason is that, after the price draw for the first good, subjects’ remaining endow-
ments for the acquisition of the second good are likely not identical. To overcome
this problem, we adapt the standard BDM procedure by using price combinations
for both goods from which one combination is drawn at the end of the experiment
to become payoff relevant.
1.2.4 Procedures
The experiments were conducted in 2011 in the BonnEconLab, using the experiment
software BoXS (Seithe 2012). We recruited a total of 182 subjects for the experiment
using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The subject pool consisted of about 6300 subjects,
most of them undergraduate students of all majors from the University of Bonn.11
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to private cubicles. The instructions
11Participants in the experiment were on average 24.0 years old, 41.2% of them were females.
Subjects’ sociodemographic variables are summarized in Table 1.7 in Appendix A.1.
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were read aloud, whereas questions were answered in private.
Before subjects received a detailed explanation of the goods they could purchase
in the experiment, they had to correctly answer control questions relating to the
modified BDM procedure. We also checked whether subjects understood the payoff
consequences of choosing the donation or the voucher. However, performing this
test before the experiment would have risked that subjects anchored their WTP at
the objective value of these goods. This test was thus performed only at the end of
the experiment with a second set of six control questions (see Appendix A.2). Since
we are only interested in analyzing the behavior of subjects who understood the
fundamentals of the experiment, participants that made more than three mistakes in
answering these questions or were unable to provide the correct anwers in a maximum
of three trials are excluded from the analysis.12 Nevertheless, including them yields
qualitatively similar results at the 10% significance level.
The number of observations in each treatment is reported in Table 2.3. Each
session of the experiment lasted no more than one hour. Subjects received average
earnings of e10.77, which include their remaining endowment after the implementa-
tion of the randomly drawn choice situation as well as the retail price of the acquired
goods.13
1.3 Behavioral Predictions
According to standard economic theory, a consumer’s willingness to pay for a com-
bination of two goods should stay unaffected by whether she can buy the goods
separately or as a bundle. After all, bundling does not alter the goods’ inherent
characteristics. This holds irrespectively of whether the goods are complements or
substitutes.14 Although complementarity or substitutability between goods can alter
the valuation for the combination of the goods, this valuation should not be influ-
enced by bundling.
However, there is reason to expect that hybrid bundling induces valuations that
12Based on this criterion, a total of 27 subjects had to be excluded from the analysis, correspond-
ing to 14.8% of all participants.
13At the time of the experiment, 1 Euro was worth approximately 1.36 US Dollar.
14For an account of affect-based complementarity between public and private goods, see Strahile-
vitz & Myers (1998).
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are not additive but superadditive. The channels we propose in this chapter suggest
that hybrid bundling results in a higher WTP for the combination of the private and
the public good than if both goods were offered separately. Our design focuses on
two channels, which we discuss below. Additional behavioral channels that may be
present in the field are discussed in Section 1.5.
First, consumers with image concerns may use hybrid bundles to signal social
preferences. Depending on the observability of the purchase and the consumption
of the hybrid bundle, this signaling can be directed both to others (e.g., Bénabou &
Tirole 2006, Ariely et al. 2009) and to oneself (e.g., Brekke et al. 2003, Bénabou &
Tirole 2006). Evidently, driving a hybrid car allows for more signaling than driving
a conventional car and purchasing the corresponding carbon offset. The same is
true for yoghurt bundled with a donation. Its purchase in the supermarket signals
social preferences both to oneself and to other customers, while arranging the same
donation in private only allows for self-signaling.
The signaling of favorable personality traits ought to have a particularly strong
influence on the evaluation of a hybrid bundle if the private good component is
durable. In this case, the use of the hybrid bundle can extend the warm glow that is
generated by the public good component (see Andreoni 1989, 1990 for the concept
of warm glow). We expect a prolongation of warm glow based on consumers’ limited
attention and imperfect recall. Whenever the consumer uses the private good, an
association with the good deed is triggered. This yields a lasting improvement of
both the consumers’ public image and her self-image. To illustrate this point, think
of a consumer donating to a charity. If this donation is bundled with a wristband,
wearing the wristband allows to easily recall and signal favorable personality traits.
In the same vein, we expect subjects to experience an extended warm glow from self-
signaling when they use the hybrid bundle from our experiment. A decision maker
who anticipates this additional utility will therefore display a higher WTP for the
bundle.
Second, bundling a public good with a private good may induce spillovers on
the perception of the private good. For bundles of private goods, Popkowski Leszczyc
et al. (2008) have already documented such spillovers between goods. They show that
a consumer who is uncertain about the value of a bundle tends to infer its value from
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a component she is certain about. However, such spillovers need not be restricted
to value inferences, but may extend to other attributes of different salience. Early
work on the assessment of subordinates has shown, for example, that the rating of
salient physical qualities affects the rating of intellectual qualities (Thorndike 1920).
Recent work on the rating of goods has identified similar interdependencies. For
example, an organic label can affect the liking of the taste of a milk shake (Linder
2011). Hybrid bundling may induce similar effects. In particular, public goods could
trigger positive connotations in the consumer that affect the rating of the attached
private good.
It has also been suggested that consumers draw inferences about firms when their
trustworthiness in providing quality is unobservable. For example, Siegel & Vitaliano
(2007) hypothesize that consumers use CSR activity to infer attributes of a firm’s
products as well as its honesty and reliability. In support of this hypothesis, they
find for U.S. data that companies are more likely to engage in CSR the harder it is
for consumers to evaluate their products before purchase. Likewise, Elfenbein et al.
(2012) show that directing a certain percentage of auction proceeds to charity serves
as a substitute for reputation in online auctions. With respect to our experiment,
we conjecture that the public good conveys positive connotations to the cup if both
are sold as a hybrid bundle.
Since both the signaling and the spillover channel can only be active in the Pub-
lic condition but not in the Private condition, we obtain the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis. The willingness to pay for the combination of both goods is higher in
the Public-Bundle treatment than in the Public-Separate treatment. There
is no increase in the valuation for both goods from the Private-Separate to the
Private-Bundle treatment.
While both outlined channels should increase the WTP for the combination of the
goods in the Public condition, each channel affects the valuations of the individual
goods differently. More precisely, in the presence of spillovers, the perception of the
cup is altered and its WTP should increase. In contrast, the channel of signaling




We start this section by analyzing subjects’ purchase decisions with respect to a
private and a public good which are either offered in the form of a bundle or sepa-
rately. To ascertain that the described behavior is specific to the type of the bundled
goods, we subsequently contrast the results for hybrid bundles to those for bundles
of two private goods. The main focus of our analysis lies on the willingness to pay
for both goods, which is the highest sum of prices at which both goods are bought,
i.e., option b) is chosen (see Section 1.2.3).
In line with our initial hypothesis, offering the public and the private good as a
hybrid bundle indeed increases subjects’ WTP for the combination of both goods.
Not only the effect itself but also its size is striking: the average WTP for both
goods increases from e1.54 in the Separate treatment to e2.48 in the Bundle
treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < 0.008).15 This corresponds to an increase of
more than 60%. The boxplot in Figure 1.1 depicts the distribution of the willingness
to pay for both goods. It reveals that the observed superadditivity is not only driven
by a minority of subjects but rather constitutes a general behavioral pattern. In
particular, the median WTP in the Bundle treatment exceeds the upper quartile
of the WTP in the Separate treatment.16 Merely being offered a private and a
public good in a bundle instead of separately hence considerably alters individuals’
valuations. The size of the effect suggests that bundling public and private goods
entails significant consequences for market demand.
Having established that hybrid bundling induces superadditivity, it is further
instructive to analyze the WTP for the private good when it is bought exclusively.
The average WTP increases from e0.67 in the Separate treatment to e1.39 in the
Bundle treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.010), which corresponds to an
important share of the increase in the WTP for the combination of both goods. Thus,
the presence of the hybrid bundle not only changes the price subjects are willing to
pay for both goods, but also seems to alter the perception of the cup itself. This
suggests that spillovers constitute a relevant channel for the observed superadditivity.
15Unless specified otherwise, all tests reported in this chapter are two-sided.
16The median of a distribution is depicted by the vertical line in the box, whereas the limits of
the box indicate the upper and the lower quartile.
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When inspecting subjects’ valuation for the public good, we have to keep in mind
that, in theBundle treatment, the donation can only be ensured if the cup is bought,
i.e., by choosing option b). For a comparable assessment of subjects’ valuations across
treatments, we may hence only focus on situations in which subjects buy the cup.
For these situations, we compare the premium that participants are willing to pay
for the donation at a specific cup price. A premium corresponds to the maximum
additional price that is paid on top of the cup price to ensure the donation. At this
donation price a subject still buys both goods (option b), whereas she no longer does
so at higher donation prices (option a, c, or d). We restrict the analysis to cup prices
of up to e2. Only two subjects in the Public-Separate treatment exhibit a higher
valuation for the cup, rendering choices for cup prices above e2 uncomparable across
treatments. Note that this focus imposes no major restrictions since the retail price
of the cup of e1.65 is contained in the analyzed price range. We are left with a total
of 65 choice situations and a minimum of six observations for every cup price in each
treatment.
The left-hand part of Figure 1.2 depicts the premiums that subjects pay for the
donation in the Separate and the Bundle treatment.17 For a cup price of e0,
subjects on average pay more to obtain the donation in addition to the cup if both
goods are offered in a bundle (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.078). Furthermore, the
mean premium for the public good gradually decreases with higher cup prices in the
17Note that higher cup prices make purchases of the cup less likely, resulting in a decreasing
number of observations along the categorical axis.
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Bundle treatment (Spearman’s rank correlation test, p = 0.032), while it is more
invariant in the Separate treatment (Spearman’s rank correlation test, p = 0.663).
This suggests that subjects evaluate the cup and the donation independently if and
only if both goods are offered separately. Given this pattern, the mean premium
for the donation is no longer significantly different between treatments for strictly
positive cup prices (Wilcoxon rank-sum test for each cup price, p > 0.370). The
described pattern also stands out in a random-effects interval regression (see Table 1.6
in Appendix A.1), a random-effects tobit regression, and a simple OLS regression.
An alternative measure of a subject’s valuation for the public good is the rela-
tive frequency of public good purchases, i.e., the percentage of choice situations in
which the subject buys the donation. In contrast to the premium, this measure has
the advantage of including all observations. In particular, it also contains subjects’
choices in which they do not buy the cup. A caveat of this measure, however, is
that it is biased towards higher purchases of the donation in the Separate treat-
ment. The reason is that acquiring the donation in the Bundle treatment requires
to also buy the cup and is therefore weakly more expensive than in the Separate
treatment. The left column of Table 1.5 provides data on the fraction of situations
in which the donation is bought.18 Subjects in the Separate treatment buy the
18In accordance with the analysis above, we again include choice situations with cup prices up
to e2.
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donation in 41.8% of the choice situations, whereas subjects in the Bundle treat-
ment buy the donation in 42.6% of the situations. Hence, bundling the donation
with the cup does not lead to less purchases of the donation (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p = 0.466, one-sided). This is particularly striking since donation purchases
in the Bundle treatment require the joint purchase of the cup. In total, the data
suggest that offering the donation in the bundle also increases subjects’ valuation
for the donation. This hints at self-signaling as a further relevant channel for the
emergence of superadditivity in hybrid bundles.




We now turn to the Private control condition in which the donation is replaced
by a voucher. Conducting the same analysis as above reveals considerable differences
to the Public condition. In the Public condition, we found a substantial increase
in the willingness to pay for the combination of a private and a public good if both
are bundled. In the Private condition, however, this effect is not present. Subjects’
WTP for the combination of the cup and the voucher does not significantly differ
between the Separate and the Bundle treatment. On average, participants pay
up to e2.15 when facing the two private goods separately and up to e2.20 for the
bundle of both goods (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.953).
We also find that the WTP for the basic private good, i.e., the cup, is not affected
when it is bundled with another private good. Subjects’ average WTP for the cup
amounts to e1.20 in the Separate treatment, whereas it is e1.26 in the Bundle
treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.972). At the same time, the right-hand
part of Figure 1.2 reveals that, contrary to the case of an attached public good,
subjects’ valuation for the voucher is not augmented if it is offered in a bundle with
the cup. The premiums are comparable between the Bundle and the Separate
treatment for low cup prices (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p > 0.418 for cup prices ≤
e0.5). However, for cup prices exceeding e0.50 subjects are less willing to spend
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money on the voucher when it is bundled (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.100,
p = 0.284, p = 0.030 for cup prices of e1, e1.50 and e2, respectively). The reason is
that, as in the Public condition, the tolerated premium in the Bundle treatment
again decreases with the cup price, but this time it is not subject to a general upward
shift. Again, this observation is supported by a random-effects interval regression
(reported in Table 1.6 in Appendix A.1), a random-effects tobit regression, and a
simple OLS regression.
Further evidence on the evaluation of the voucher comes from an examination of
its purchase frequencies. As reported in the right column of Table 1.5, the voucher
is bought in 44.1% of the choice situations in the Separate treatment, while it is
bought in only 30.4% of the situations in the Bundle treatment. Hence, bundling
the voucher with the cup leads to less purchases of the voucher (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p = 0.007, one-sided). This is not surprising per se, since subjects in the
Bundle treatment have to buy the cup along with the voucher. However, this result
is in stark contrast to the Public condition, in which purchases of the public good
stay unaffected by bundling.
It should generally be noted, however, that we cannot compare the willingness
to pay for the cup and the bundle across the Public and the Private condition.
Not only are the offered goods different, but also the level of awareness of the public
good, even though constant within each condition, is distinct across conditions.
Subjects in the Public condition are explicitly made aware of public good issues by
being provided with the opportunity to spend money on a public good within the
experiment. This in turn leads to different perceived opportunity costs of purchasing
the cup between the Public and the Private condition. In the post-experimental
questionnaire, nine out of 44 participants in the Public-Separate treatment stated
that they considered the donation as more meaningful than the cup. This suggests
that the opportunity costs of acquiring the cup were relatively high in the Public
condition, which induced a lower demand for it in this condition.19 We did not
observe similar statements in the Private condition.
Despite random assignment of subjects to treatments, a concern could be that
19That the awareness of opportunity costs alters purchase decisions has been demonstrated by
Frederick et al. (2009).
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our results are due to sampling. In the post-experimental questionnaire, we therefore
elicited variables that might affect the general spending patterns of subjects (see
Table 1.7 in Appendix A.1). All non-parametric results of this chapter are supported
in regressions controlling for these sociodemographic and personality variables.
Summarizing and interpreting our results, we can state the following: Bundling
a public and a private good significantly increases the willingness to pay for the
combination of both goods. No such effect is observed if two private goods are
bundled. We conclude that it is the combination of a public and a private good that
plays a decisive role for the documented superadditivity.
1.5 Further Channels
The results of our experiment are in line with the two behavioral channels of sig-
naling and spillovers. However, these channels are not necessary for creating super-
additivity, since the field offers a wider range of channels than our experiment. The
following discussion of additional channels indicates that many hybrid bundles may
induce superadditivity, though the relevance of each channel will depend on the
specific bundle and context in question. We first describe channels that are predomi-
nantly active for hybrid bundles. Subsequently, we turn to channels which affect
the valuation of all types of bundles and discuss why all channels proposed in this
section are inactive in our experiment.
1.5.1 Hybrid Bundles
First, by attaching a public good to a private good, the willingness to pay for the
public good might increase because the presence of the hybrid bundle in the market
can raise consumers’ awareness of the public good. Awareness of the externalities
of one’s actions and a strong feeling of personal responsibility, in turn, have been
shown to prompt decision makers to partly internalize these externalities and act
less selfishly (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008, Hamman et al. 2010).
Second, offering a bundle entails a suggestion to the consumer and thereby shapes
consumers’ purchase decisions, similar to a default. Seeing the bundle, the consumer
may conjecture that the retailer expects consumers to be interested in buying it.
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This implicit suggestion by the retailer creates an additional purchase incentive.
The suggestive power entailed by the presentation of options has been shown for
investment and savings behavior as well as for organ donations (e.g., Benartzi &
Thaler 2001, Madrian & Shea 2001, McKenzie et al. 2006). A sufficient condition for
such effects is a decision maker’s uncertainty over her preferences (Kamenica 2008).
Companies’ product lines may also alter consumers’ beliefs about the consumption
of others. If a hybrid bundle is offered, these altered beliefs may create a social
norm to contribute to the public good and thereby trigger conditionally cooperative
behavior (e.g., Cialdini et al. 1990, Traxler &Winter 2012). Such an effect on demand
is generally not induced by bundles of private goods.20 Therefore, the suggestive
power of hybrid bundles should be stronger than that of bundles of private goods.
The induced demand is in turn reflected in a higher WTP for the hybrid bundle than
for the separate goods before the bundle’s introduction.
1.5.2 Bundles in General
It has been shown that consumers make mistakes in information aggregation when
evaluating bundles of private goods. According to experiments by Gaeth et al. (1991)
and Yadav (1994), information aggregation is performed by averaging over the sepa-
rate categorial evaluations of a bundle’s components. In this process, the individual
evaluations obtain weights that do not reflect the components’ values. This can both
be a consequence of simple averaging (Anderson 1981) or an anchoring and adjust-
ment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Due to this biased information aggre-
gation, attaching a high-quality but low-value good (such as a rather small donation
to charity) to another good may disproportionally increase the quality rating of the
two goods and hence the overall WTP.
Furthermore, based on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), Thaler
(1985) argues that consumers have a preference to integrate losses. Thus, the presen-
tation of a single price for multiple items, i.e., bundling, can increase the demand for
these items. This argument is supported in experiments on bundles of private goods
(e.g., Drumwright 1992, Johnson et al. 1999).
20An exception may be bundles of private goods with network effects, since they may induce
similar interdependencies in decision makers’ utility.
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Moreover, the purchase of two goods in the form of a bundle also reduces the
pain of paying and the transaction costs that go along with every purchase. The
former implies that consumers prefer to reduce the number of monetary transactions
(Prelec & Loewenstein 1998, Rick et al. 2008). The latter, transaction costs, are well
accepted to be part of every purchase. Bundling does not only change the number
of transactions for the purchase of multiple products but can also reduce the search
costs related to their acquisition. For example, consumers often have to find suitable
complementary products for goods they wish to purchase (e.g., a zoom lens for a
camera). Similar search costs are present for public goods. For example, donations
can be directed to multiple organizations which differ in their scope and efficacy. By
suggesting particular organizations or projects, a firm selling a bundle reduces these
costs.
All channels explained above drive an increase in the valuation for bundles.
Nonetheless, there also exists a behavioral channel which supports subadditivity.
More precisely, unpacking a good into its parts can increase the parts’ salience and
thereby raise the valuation for the sum of its components. This has been termed the
‘unpacking effect’. For instance, Rottenstreich & Tversky (1997) find that subjective
probabilities of uncertain events increase when the events are decomposed into dis-
joint components. Subadditivity in valuations has also been documented for events
described in different detail (Johnson et al. 1993, Van Boven & Epley 2003) and for
the demand of either unpacked private goods (Bateman et al. 1997) or unpacked
public goods (Bernasconi et al. 2009). Thus, if bundling decreases the salience of
product characteristics, bundles may also be valued less than the sum of their parts.
1.5.3 Discussion
None of the channels presented in this section drives the results of our experiment.
We explain in the following how these channels are precluded by the experimental
design.
Both the Separate and the Bundle treatment provide the opportunity to make
a contribution to the public good, effectively inducing the same level of awareness
of the public good. Moreover, in contrast to firms’ product lines, the goods offered
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in the experiment are evidently not a response to market demand. Hence, subjects
in both treatments learn the same about the desirability of the public good and the
purchase behavior of others. The hybrid bundle thus neither entails suggestive power
nor does it increase the awareness of the public good in the experiment.
Also channels affecting bundles in general are either inactive or controlled for
by the Private treatments. Since the offered goods have comparable objective
values (e1.65 for the cup vs. e2 for the donation and the voucher), subjects are
unlikely to make substantial mistakes if they assign equal weights to the goods in
their information aggregation. Furthermore, the experiment keeps both the degree
of detail in the description of the goods and the individual goods’ salience constant
across treatments to exclude valuation differences due to unpacking. Finally, also
the channels of loss integration, pain of paying, and transaction costs would affect
the WTP for bundles in the Public and the Private condition similarly and are
thus controlled for.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze the effect of hybrid bundling on individuals’ willingness
to pay. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we elicit subjects’ WTP for a
private and a public good, varying across subjects whether the public good is sold
separately or in a bundle with the private good. We find that the WTP for both
goods is about 60% higher when they are sold as a bundle. In contrast, we observe
no such effect when two private goods are bundled.
We lay out two behavioral channels that support our results. The first one,
self-signaling, stems from an extension of warm glow to the whole usage period of
the underlying private good. The second one, spillovers, originates from positive
connotations of public goods (e.g., Bjørner et al. 2004, Elfenbein et al. 2012) that
carry over to the attached private good. The field offers additional channels that we
discuss in Section 1.5. Hence, the superadditivity documented by our experiment
should be present for a wide range of hybrid bundles in natural environments.
The higher valuation that subjects attribute to both the public and the private
good when bundled indicates that markets may play a stronger role in the provi-
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sion of public goods than is commonly acknowledged. Both charitable organizations
and the private sector may gain from offering hybrid bundles. Such cooperations
increasingly evolve and raise significant contributions to public goods. The UNICEF-
Volvic program for providing drinking water in rural Africa elicited $2.5 million in
the U.S. and Canada from 2008 to 2009. This corresponds to more than 1.6% of all
private-sector donations to UNICEF in these countries. Fostering these cooperations
can circumvent political concerns related to tax-based funding as well as the problem
of assessing peoples’ valuation for specific public goods.
Our results also suggest that hybrid bundling bears the potential to improve a
company’s sales. The findings thus serve as an explanation for the widening appli-
cation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) measures by firms, as companies
that link social activities to the sales of their products effectively bundle private
with public goods. However, since firms’ CSR campaigns often go along with altered
levels of advertisement and a reshaped image of the company (Baron 2001), the net
effect of hybrid bundling on consumers’ WTP so far remained unexplored. Our lab
experiment abstracts from this image channel and provides clean evidence on how
hybrid bundling affects consumers’ valuations for the bundled products. The degree
to which the WTP increase serves the firm, the good cause, and the consumer is
ultimately determined by the market structure.
This chapter constitutes a first step towards understanding the valuation for
public goods in markets and documents that the evaluations of public and private
goods are interdependent. We therefore see this chapter also as a starting point for
future research. For example, it seems important to further evaluate the relevance
of the discussed channels in mediating superadditivity. Particular interest should
lie on the extent to which self-signaling is responsible for the increase in valuations.
If a favorable identity or a desired level of warm glow is maintained more easily
through the use of hybrid bundles, prosocial activity in other environments might
be crowded out. Thus, if this effect turns out to be dominating in the field, total
voluntary contributions can decrease when hybrid bundles are available. A similar
point is made by Engelmann et al. (2012) who show experimentally that a hybrid
bundle with only token contributions to a public good may crowd out total charitable
giving by creating moral wiggle room.
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Furthermore, to determine the share of the WTP increase that is due to spillovers,
it will be important to distinguish a truly increased appreciation of the private good
when observing a hybrid bundle from a preference for consistency (Falk & Zimmer-
mann 2011). Such a preference may induce a discrepancy between stated and true
valuations. In our case, this could result in high stated valuations for the private
good if the hybrid bundle is valued highly.
This chapter also opens the discussion of public good evaluation in a broader
context. According to our results, hybrid bundling increases the private gains from
the provision of the bundled public good. Thus, hybrid bundling could divert volun-
tary contributions away from public goods with higher social return. An extension
of this chapter in which a second, more efficient public good is introduced could
deliver insights into this problem. Subsequent studies may also wish to adopt a
dynamic perspective and focus on repeated decisions. Given the current state of
knowledge about the interdependencies of public and private good evaluations, this




Table 1.6: Premium paid for the second good
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
Premium paid for the donation/voucher Public Private




Bundle × cup price −0.186** −0.236***
(0.091) (0.072)




Notes: This table shows marginal effects from random-effects interval regressions (boot-
strapped standard errors are given in parentheses). The dependent variable is the
premium a subject is willing to pay for the donation or the voucher, respectively. The
variable “cup price” indicates the price at which the cup is offered in each considered
situation. The variable “Bundle” is a dummy variable indicating treatment Bundle.
“Bundle × cup price” is the corresponding interaction between treatment and cup price.
Individual controls include gender, age, financial situation, and Big Five personality
traits. Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
28










Female 0.64 0.53 0.68 0.50
(0.49) (0.51) (0.47) (0.51)
Age 23.32 24.00 23.73 24.19
(3.25) (3.07) (3.60) (6.61)
Liquidity 0.89 0.81 0.84 0.79
(0.32) (0.40) (0.37) (0.42)
Big Five
Openness 0.52 0.60 0.55 0.42
(1.03) (1.03) (0.94) (1.08)
Conscientiousness −0.82 −0.68 −0.76 −0.82
(1.17) (1.03) (0.98) (1.25)
Extraversion −0.27 0.25 0.09 0.07
(1.02) (1.07) (1.17) (1.30)
Agreeableness −0.77 −0.56 −0.48 −0.34
(1.02) (0.87) (1.11) (0.96)
Neuroticism −0.10 −0.15 −0.06 −0.01
(1.14) (1.06) (1.11) (1.03)
Observations 44 32 37 42
Notes: This table shows means over all observations in the respective treat-
ments. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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A.2 Instructions
In the following, we provide the instructions for treatment Public-Bundle. The
instructions for the other treatments were adapted appropriately and are available
from the authors upon request.
Information on the experiment
You are now participating in an economic experiment, during which you will receive
money and have the opportunity to buy goods. The payoff that you receive from
this experiment depends on your personal decisions.
The decisions that you take during the experiment will be analyzed in an exclu-
sively anonymous way. This means that your decisions will never be related to your
identity. During the experiment any kind of communication is absolutely forbidden.
If you have any questions, put a hand out of your booth. The experimenters will then
come to your booth and answer your question there, so that the other participants
will not be disturbed.
In the following, different situations will be presented to you. In each of these
situations you have to decide which one of two available goods (good A and good B)
you want to buy at the given prices (or whether you want to buy none of the goods
at the given prices). For the purchase of the goods you are provided with an amount
of e10 (your initial endowment) in each situation.
Each of the overall 104 choice situations is labeled with a number. One of these
situations will be paid out to you afterwards. After the experiment, this situation
will be determined by drawing a random number between 1 and 104. Each of the
numbers is equally probable. Since, when taking your decision, you of course do
not yet know which number will be drawn, you have to think about each of your
decisions carefully because each can potentially become relevant for you.
You will receive your payoff directly after this experiment. At this occasion, every
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participant will also draw her individual random number.
Your payoff is:
if you bought endowment (e10)
good A - price of good A
(+ good A)
if you bought endowment (e10)
good B - price of good B
(+ good B)
if you bought
neither good A nor good B endowment (e10)
An example:
Consider the case in which the following situation with the number 37 is presented
to you:
situation good A good B nothing
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
price: e3.20 price: e3.60
no. 37
O buy O buy O buy nothing
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
This means that you have the choice to either buy only good A at e3.20, only good B
at e3.60 or none of both goods. If you do not want to buy any of the goods, you do
not incur any costs, i.e., you keep your endowment of e10.
If you want to buy good A at e3.20 in this situation, you have to tick the correspond-
ing box so that the screen looks like this:
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situation good A good B nothing
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
price: e3.20 price: e3.60
no. 37
X buy O buy O buy nothing
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
If you draw the random number 37 afterwards, which corresponds to the situation
above, you will accordingly receive good A as well as e6.80 (e10 - e3.20).
If you want to buy good B at e3.60 in this situation, you accordingly have to select
’buy’ in the column for good B. If you draw the random number 37 afterwards, you
will receive good B as well as e6.40 (e10 - e3.60).
If you do not want to buy any of both goods in this situation, you accordingly
have to select ’buy nothing’ in the right column. If you draw the random number 37
afterwards, you will receive none of the goods but e10 (e10 - e0) instead.
If you draw a different random number, the decision that you have taken for this
other situation becomes payoff relevant.
Before the actual experiment starts, we ask you to answer the control questions
that will appear on your screen in a few seconds. In case, doing this, you still have




1) Which boxes do you have to tick if - facing prices of e4.90 for good A and of
e6.70 for good B in situation a) - you prefer the purchase of good A over the
purchase of good B as well as over the non-purchase of both goods?
situation good A good B nothing
price: e4.90 price: e6.70
no. a)
O buy O buy O buy nothing
2) Which payoff would you receive in this case at the end of the experiment (includ-
ing the initial endowment of e10) if situation a) was randomly drawn?
Good A: O Yes O No
Good B: O Yes O No
Money: Euro
Case II:
1) Which boxes do you have to tick if - facing prices of e1.50 for good A and of
e4.10 for good B in situation b) - you prefer to buy none of the goods?
situation good A good B nothing
price: e1.50 price: e4.10
no. b)
O buy O buy O buy nothing
2) Which payoff would you receive in this case at the end of the experiment (includ-
ing the initial endowment of e10) if situation b) was randomly drawn?
Good A: O Yes O No




1) Which boxes do you have to tick if you face prices of e3.30 for good A and of
e4.00 for good B in situation c), but are willing to pay at most e3.10 for good
A and at most e4.30 for good B in this situation?
situation good A good B nothing
price: e3.30 price: e4.00
no. c)
O buy O buy O buy nothing
2) Which payoff would you receive in this case at the end of the experiment (includ-
ing the initial endowment of e10) if situation c) was randomly drawn?
Good A: O Yes O No
Good B: O Yes O No
Money: Euro
Case IV:
1) Which boxes do you have to tick if you face prices of e1.70 for good A and of
e5.20 for good B in situation d), but are willing to pay at most e3.10 for good
A and at most e4.30 for good B in this situation?
situation good A good B nothing
price: e1.70 price: e5.20
no. d)
O buy O buy O buy nothing
2) Which payoff would you receive in this case at the end of the experiment (includ-
ing the initial endowment of e10) if situation d) was randomly drawn?
Good A: O Yes O No
Good B: O Yes O No
Money: Euro
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Further information on the experiment
In this experiment you can buy goods whose values are likely to be subjectively dif-
ferent. In this respect, there do not exist any wrong or correct purchase decisions
for you as a participant. You can acquire the following goods:
Good A:
The first available good is a ‘blackboard cup’ (see the picture below). With the
included chalk it can always be daubed or labeled anew.
Good B:
The second available good is an identical ‘blackboard cup’ which, however, goes along
with a donation of e2 to “Kindernothilfe”. The experimenters donate this amount
for you if you buy this second good. The donation amount of e2 is independent of
the purchase price, i.e., you only have to pay the respective purchase price, while
the donation of e2 is performed by the experimenters. (“Kindernothilfe” supports
destitute children in 28 countries of the world. The corresponding donation receipt
can be inspected immediately after you have received your payoff.)
In the following, we ask you - as described above - to decide in each of the presented
situations whether you want to buy
• either the ‘blackboard cup’
• or the ‘blackboard cup’ that goes along with the e2 donation
• or none of the goods
at the given prices.
35
Control Questions II
Please answer the following additional questions by filling in the blanks.
Case 1:
Suppose the cup is offered at a price of e1 and the cup with donation at a
price of e1.70. Furthermore, suppose that you buy the cup with donation in
this situation and that you indeed draw this situation.
How many Euros do the experimenters donate to “Kindernothilfe”?
Answer: Euro
How many Euros do you have to pay additionally so that - instead of only receiving
the cup - you also effect the donation?
Answer: Euro
How many Euros do you have to pay altogether (i.e., for the cup with donation)?
Answer: Euro
Case 2:
Suppose that the cup is offered at a price of e1.50 and the cup with donation
at a price of e3.70. Furthermore, suppose that you buy the cup with donation
in this situation and that you indeed draw this situation.
How many Euros do the experimenters donate to “Kindernothilfe”?
Answer: Euro
How many Euros do you have to pay additionally so that - instead of only receiving
the cup - you also effect the donation?
Answer: Euro




Figure 1.3: Screenshot, treatment Public-Separate
Figure 1.4: Screenshot, treatment Public-Bundle
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Chapter 2
Sabotage and Cooperation in Job
Promotions
2.1 Introduction
Promotions constitute an important incentive device in firms and other organiza-
tions. However, they typically do not occur in isolation but are followed by inter-
action between promoted and non-promoted individuals. If, for example, the head
of a team retires, oftentimes a former team member is designated to take the vacant
position, so that future interaction between the competitors for the superior position
is almost unavoidable. Naturally, it is in the interest of the firm that this subsequent
interaction be as productive, i.e., cooperative, as possible. Likewise, the initial com-
petition between employees should, from the firm’s point of view, not be too fierce,
in the sense that unproductive sabotage activities should be abstained from. Thus,
given that job promotions can be designed in many different ways, the choice of the
appropriate promotion scheme may be a crucial factor for attaining these two goals.
In this respect, the present paper evaluates and compares the two most important
job promotion schemes within firms, usually referred to as vertical and lateral promo-
tions.1 To ensure a common understanding of the underlying promotion procedures,
1I acknowledge that a firm may also fill vacant positions with candidates from outside the firm.
However, since promotion schemes in the sense of predefined career paths shall lie at the heart of
this paper, I will not consider external promotions in the following.
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I would like to illustrate both promotion schemes with the help of the following
example. Consider a firm with a network of sales agents who are organized in several
divisions. If one of the positions as division manager becomes vacant, usually a very
natural solution consists in appointing a division’s best performing sales agent to this
job, thus providing sales agents with incentives to compete for promotion. However,
vertical and lateral promotions differ with respect to whether the promoted sales
agent has previously worked in the same or a different division than the one with
the vacancy. More precisely, under the vertical promotion scheme, a division’s sales
agents compete for the position as manager of the same division, whereas under
lateral promotions, a division’s best performing agent will become the manager of a
different division. For a graphical representation of vertical and lateral promotions,
see Figure 2.1 in Section 2.2.
Based on the above characterizations of vertical and lateral job promotions, this
paper analyzes how both promotion schemes affect individuals’ behavior i) in the
competition for promotion as well as ii) in the subsequent interaction between pro-
moted and non-promoted individuals. With the help of controlled laboratory ex-
periments I study two main questions. First, I am interested in whether people,
when taking their decisions in the competitive stage, take into account that they
will or will not continue to interact with their opponent after the promotion. The
corresponding results will also help to answer the question of whether one of the pro-
motion schemes has particularly desirable properties. Second, I study whether the
experience of competition, which is inherent in job promotions, can have disadvan-
tageous effects on individuals’ behavior in subsequent interactions. An affirmative
answer to this question would call for a more general reconsideration of the use and
appropriateness of promotion tournaments.
I address these questions with two main and an additional control treatment in a
between-subjects design. The main treatments, Vertical and Lateral, reproduce
vertical and lateral job promotions, in particular capturing the already described
two-stage nature. The first competitive stage is implemented as a tournament with
binary sabotage in which two participants compete for promotion (see, e.g., Falk
et al. 2008). After the tournament, competitors are informed about their opponent’s
previous decisions as well as about the outcome of the tournament. In the second
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stage, promoted and non-promoted subjects interact with each other according to
the new hierarchy. Similar to the sales agent example introduced above, they play a
gift-exchange game, which is frequently used to study cooperative behavior (see, e.g.,
Fehr et al. 1993, 1997, Gächter & Falk 2002, Abeler et al. 2010, Kube et al. 2012).
Tournament winners are thereby assigned to the role of a principal, whereas tourna-
ment losers take the role of an agent. The treatment variation consists in whether
competitors continue to interact with each other in the second experimental stage
or face a different individual there whose tournament behavior they are completely
unaware of. Comparing both treatments thus allows to test whether the presumably
different relevance of reciprocal preferences between treatments translates into be-
havioral differences.2 Based on participants’ behavior in the main treatments, the
control treatment, GE-Only, takes the initial promotion outcome as given and con-
sists of the gift-exchange stage only. In combination with the main treatments, it
therefore allows me to study to what extent individuals’ cooperative behavior may
be affected by the previous experience of competition.
My findings can be summarized as follows: first, participants’ behavior in the pro-
motion tournament differs considerably between treatments. Most importantly, there
exist substantial differences in subjects’ inclination to engage in sabotage. Sabo-
tage occurs more than 50% more often in Lateral than in Vertical. Second,
principals’ and agents’ behavior in the gift-exchange game does, in contrast, not
significantly differ between both main treatments. Aggregated over both experimen-
tal stages, treatment Vertical consequently leads to higher social efficiency than
treatment Lateral according to various efficiency measures. Third, participants’
behavior in the gift-exchange game does not significantly differ between GE-Only
and the main treatments. Competitive experience therefore seems to have no effect
on subjects’ gift-exchange game behavior. In particular, my results thus show that
job promotions do not influence subjects’ behavior negatively. In fact, the opposite
holds true, especially if one refers to vertical promotions.
So far, competition and cooperation of the same individuals usually have been
considered as incompatible and inefficient. For a one-stage setting, i.e., an environ-
2The interplay between vertical and lateral promotions and social preferences has also been
touched on by Grund & Sliwka (2005). The authors incorporate in their model that “compassion and
envy are stronger when promotions are vertical”. However, this assumption is not empirically tested.
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ment in which people are required to cooperate while competing for promotion, this
view has been put forward inter alia by Lazear (1992) and Baron & Kreps (1999).
By contrast, my results indicate that in a frequently occurring two-stage setting,
i.e., an environment in which people are required to cooperate after having com-
peted for promotion, it may well be advantageous for firms and social welfare to have
the same individuals compete and subsequently cooperate. As my results show, the
anticipation of future interaction with the same instead of a different person affects
participants’ behavior in the tournament positively, leading subjects to refrain more
often from sabotage under vertical promotions. Given that tournaments with sabo-
tage, when studied in isolation, have proven to be rather inefficient, since i) many
subjects actually engage in costly sabotage and ii) subjects provide lower effort than
if the opportunity to sabotage is absent (e.g., Lazear 1989, Falk et al. 2008, Car-
penter et al. 2010, Harbring & Irlenbusch 2011), my paper suggests that subsequent
interaction may mitigate this problem.
My experimental findings, in particular those documenting the treatment dif-
ference in individuals’ tournament behavior, are consistent with participants exhibit-
ing reciprocal preferences. In Appendix B.2, I provide an extension of the model of
action-based reciprocity of Cox et al. (2007), which shows that there may well be
equilibria in which individuals with reciprocal preferences refrain from sabotage if
promotions are vertical but not if they are lateral.3 The reason is that the antici-
pation of further interaction with the same subject and correspondingly strong reci-
procal inclinations may be able to discipline participants under vertical promotions,
whereas under lateral promotions similar concerns are largely ruled out by design.
Nevertheless, there still exists a discrepancy between subjects’ anticipated and their
actually exhibited reciprocal inclination at the end of the tournament stage, since
principals’ and agents’ behavior in the gift-exchange game does not significantly differ
between treatments.
The findings of this paper first of all inform the literature on tournaments with
sabotage and on gift-exchange games (e.g., Akerlof 1982, Lazear 1989, Fehr et al.
1993, Gächter & Falk 2002, Falk et al. 2008, Carpenter et al. 2010, Harbring & Ir-
3For further theory-based studies on the behavioral relevance of reciprocity and other motives
beyond self-interest, see, e.g., Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton &
Ockenfels (2000), Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk & Fischbacher (2006).
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lenbusch 2011, Kube et al. 2012). So far, these strands of the literature have studied
the respective games almost exclusively in isolation, whereas my paper focuses on a
two-stage setting in which individuals experience a tournament with sabotage and a
gift-exchange game sequentially. In this regard, my paper also adds to the growing
literature on spillover effects between games (e.g., Nalbantian & Schotter 1997, Duffy
& Kornienko 2010, Sheremeta & Savikhin 2013), which, to the best of my knowledge,
has not yet studied the structured sequential experience of competition and coopera-
tion analyzed in this paper. Interestingly, the irrelevance of competitive experience
for subjects’ behavior in the cooperative stage that this paper uncovers also obtains
in a simultaneous setting, as shown by Sheremeta & Savikhin (2013). Given that
in my experiments many people take into account how their tournament decisions
may affect other subjects’ reciprocal inclinations, my findings also contribute to the
strand of the tournament literature that incorporates behavioral aspects (e.g., Grund
& Sliwka 2005, Kräkel 2008, Altmann et al. 2012). Finally, my paper also comple-
ments the theoretical and empirical literature on labor markets, which so far has
often focused on the comparison of internal promotions and external recruitment,
while rather having neglected the case of lateral promotions (e.g., Chan 1996, 2006,
Waldman 2003, DeVaro & Morita 2013).
From a policy perspective, my results are telling as well. They underline that job
promotions may affect employee behavior and in particular mitigate sabotage, which
usually constitutes a major drawback of tournaments (e.g., Chen 2005, Harbring
et al. 2007, Falk et al. 2008, Carpenter et al. 2010, Harbring & Irlenbusch 2011).
In particular, my findings demonstrate that more desirable outcomes are attained
if promotions are vertical. For firms and other organizations it may therefore be
attractive to design career paths such that the same instead of different employees
are sequentially exposed to competitive and cooperative incentive schemes. At the
same time, my results show that potentially adverse effects on cooperative behavior,
caused by the experience of competition, need not be feared.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: while Section 2.2 presents the
design of my experiment, Section 2.3 derives the corresponding behavioral predictions
for individuals who are rational and selfish as well as for individuals with reciprocal
preferences. Section 2.4 presents the results of my two main treatments and the
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control treatment. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
My experiment consists of two main treatments and one additional control treat-
ment, set up in a between-subjects design. The main treatments shall reproduce
vertical and lateral promotions and thus capture the most essential features of job
promotions, in particular their two-stage nature and the assignment of tournament
winners and losers to the roles of principals or agents, respectively. The control treat-
ment takes the initial promotion outcome as given and allows me to study to what
extent cooperative behavior may be affected by previous competitive experience.4
In the following, I present the design of my experiment in three steps: I start with
a detailed description of the games that subjects face in both experimental stages.
Afterwards, I present the different treatments and explain why they allow i) for a
clean comparison of vertical and lateral promotions as well as ii) to assess the rele-
vance of competitive experience in explaining individuals’ inclination to cooperate.
The experimental procedures are described at the end of this section.
2.2.1 Basic Games
In the first experimental stage, two participants compete against each other in a
tournament with binary sabotage (see, e.g., Falk et al. 2008). Subjects are endowed
with ω = 20 each and decide simultaneously how much effort, e ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 10},
to provide and whether to engage in sabotage, s ∈ {0, 1}.5 Both the provision of
effort and sabotage is costly for the contestants. While sabotage entails fixed costs
of cs = 20, effort costs are convex according to Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Effort levels and costs of effort
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
4Please note already at this point that subjects are provided with complete information about
their treatment, including the order and type of the games played, at the very beginning of the
experiment.
5s = 1 indicates a subject’s decision for sabotage, whereas s = 0 if she refrains from sabotage.
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Both decision variables as well as a random error term,  ∈ [0, 2], capturing
output shocks or measurement error of output, influence a participant’s output, y,
and thereby also her chances of winning the tournament.6 More precisely, output
is given by the function yi = (ei + i) · (1 − sj). Own output is thus increasing
in own effort and one’s error term, whereas being sabotaged by one’s opponent
(sj = 1) immediately leads to an output of zero. The subject with higher output
wins the tournament and receives the winner prize, wP = 90. The tournament loser
receives the loser prize, wA = 30. In case of a tie, the winner of the tournament
is determined by an additional random draw. The corresponding first-stage payoffs
of tournament winners and losers are given by piwinner1i = wP − c(ei) − cs · si and
piloser1i = wA − c(ei)− cs · si, respectively.
In the second stage, subjects participate in a gift-exchange game, which is fre-
quently used to study cooperative behavior (e.g., Fehr et al. 1993, 1997, Gächter &
Falk 2002). In the present context of job promotions this game fits particularly well
because it assumes a hierarchy between subjects, which can very naturally be based
on the outcome of the initial promotion tournament here. More precisely, as pro-
moted individuals usually become the new boss of a certain group of non-promoted
coworkers, tournament winners play the gift-exchange game in the role of a princi-
pal, whereas tournament losers take on the role of an agent. Every principal is then
matched to exactly one agent and has to choose a transfer payment, t ∈ [0, 100], that
she wants to direct to her agent. After having observed this payment, the agent has
to decide how many points, p ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10}, to allocate to her principal. While
the allocation of points entails convex costs for the agent according to Table 2.2, the
principal benefits from these points with the factor v = 15. Principals’ and agents’
payoffs from the second stage are thus given by the functions pi2P = 15 · p − t and
pi2A = t− c(p), respectively.
Table 2.2: Points allocated and costs of point allocation
p 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(p) 0 0.5 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
6Note that for each subject an individual error term is independently drawn from the same
distribution, i.e., i and j are assumed to be i.i.d..
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Between both games, i.e., immediately after subjects have taken their tournament
decisions, every participant is informed i) about whether she has won or lost the
tournament and whether she will play the gift-exchange game in the role of a principal
or an agent, ii) about her own effort and sabotage decision, iii) about her opponent’s
effort and sabotage decision, and iv) about her income after the tournament.
2.2.2 Treatments
As this paper is interested in whether the incentives provided by vertical and late-
ral promotions are perceived and responded to differently, my two main treatments
replicate both promotion schemes of interest. The matching procedure constitutes
the crucial treatment variation, since vertical and lateral promotions only differ in
the way tournament winners and losers are matched, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
More precisely, I consider one treatment, Vertical, in which the same two sub-
jects interact with each other in both the competitive and the cooperative stage of
the promotion scheme. In Vertical there is hence sufficient scope for reputation
and common-history-based social concerns like reciprocity or emotions to come into
play. The second treatment, Lateral, is identical to the first one, except for the
fact that subjects are now rematched after the tournament stage. Each individual
consequently interacts with two different subjects in both stages of the experiment.
Given this setting, I analyze in a between-subjects design whether participants’ effort
and sabotage decisions as well as the chosen transfer payments and point allocations
differ between Vertical and Lateral.
Figure 2.1: Vertical and lateral promotions7
Vertical promotion Lateral promotion
MA MB MA MB
SA1 ↔ SA2 SA3 ↔ SA4 SA1 ↔ SA2 SA3 ↔ SA4
division A division B division A division B
7Sticking to the terms used in the initial example in Section 2.1, the abbreviations SAi and Mi
indicate ‘sales agents’ and ‘division managers’, respectively.
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At this point a final concern could still be that the experience of competition
significantly alters participants’ gift-exchange game behavior. I therefore implement
a third treatment, GE-Only, that allows me to properly address this issue. Treat-
ment GE-Only consists of only one stage in which subjects play a gift-exchange
game either in the role of a principal or an agent with a randomly matched partner.
To ensure that gift-exchange game results in Vertical and Lateral on the one
hand and GE-Only on the other hand can appropriately be compared, also sub-
jects’ endowments need to be sufficiently comparable. I therefore endow principals
(agents) in GE-Only with the average amount that principals (agents) in the main
treatments possess at the beginning of the gift-exchange stage.8
For a short overview, Table 2.3 again summarizes all conducted treatments and
their most important design features.
Table 2.3: Treatments
Treatment Tournament Gift-Exchange FeaturesStage Stage
Vertical X X the tournament winner becomes a principal, and the
loser of the same tournament becomes her agent
Lateral X X the tournament winner becomes a principal, and the
loser of a different tournament becomes her agent
GE-Only X subjects are randomly matched to the position of a
principal or an agent; their endowments correspond
to the average earnings that principals in Vertical
and Lateral have acquired until the beginning of
the gift-exchange stage
2.2.3 Procedures
The experiment was run in 2013 at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the
University of Bonn (BonnEconLab). All experimental treatments were programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Recruitment was made
using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). While 48 subjects took part in each of the main
8I acknowledge that it would also have been possible to assign endowments in GE-Only based
on the distribution of principals’ and agents’ pre-gift-exchange endowments in the main treatments.
However, given that average pre-gift-exchange endowments are almost identical in Vertical and
Lateral, I opted in favor of the endowment averages to keep the situation as simple as possible
for the participants.
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treatments, 42 subjects participated in the control treatment, leading to a total
of 138 study participants. During the experiment participants could earn Taler in
addition to their show-up fee, which were transformed into Euros at the end of the
experiment at a rate of 1 Taler = e0.05. On average, subjects earned about e6.55
per session.9 Each session lasted no more than one hour.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to private cubicles and received
written instructions, which were afterwards also read aloud (see Appendix B.3). In
order to check whether participants had understood the design of the experiment,
in particular the different games and the matching procedure, they had to answer
a set of control questions. Only after having solved these questions correctly, sub-
jects entered the actual experiment. Throughout the experiment, interaction was
anonymous and subjects did not learn the identity of other participants they were
interacting with.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to fill out different question-
naires. Besides information on their sociodemographics, also other more specific
characteristics that might explain participants’ behavior in the experiment were of
particular interest for me. Inter alia, I used the Competitive Index by Smither &
Houston (1992) to assess individuals’ level of competitiveness, which might in par-
ticular be related to their first-stage decisions, as well as the Cognitive Reflection
Test by Frederick (2005), which constitutes an established predictor of an individual’s
cognitive abilities.
2.3 Behavioral Predictions
Having outlined the design of my experiment in Section 2.2, the current section is
dedicated to the corresponding behavioral predictions. I derive the predictions ac-
cording to standard theory first, before I discuss potential departures from these
predictions that may result if I allow for social aspects in subjects’ decision-making
process, like reciprocal preferences or reputation building. As an example, Ap-
pendix B.2 introduces a suitable model of action-based reciprocity. This model
extends the one of Cox et al. (2007) by taking into account the behavior of two indi-
9At the time of the experiment, 1 Euro was worth approximately 1.34 US dollars.
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viduals in two stages, explicitly allowing for interdependencies between the stages.
2.3.1 Predictions for Rational and Selfish Individuals
As a natural benchmark for the behavioral predictions in the presence of reciprocal
preferences or reputation building that are derived in the next section, I now present
the predictions according to standard economic theory.
The experimental setting being a two-stage game, rational individuals will solve
this game by backward induction, i.e., starting with the gift-exchange game. In this
game, purely money-maximizing agents will always allocate the minimal number of
points to their principal. Rational and selfish principals, in turn, will anticipate
this behavior and therefore offer no more than the minimal transfer payment. The
continuation values after the tournament stage thus being zero for both principals
and agents, in the first experimental stage subjects will solely respond to the direct
incentives of the promotion tournament. Since these are relatively high-powered,
with a tournament prize spread of 60 Taler, the strictly dominant tournament stra-
tegy consists in sabotaging one’s opponent, while providing only minimal effort. The
reason is that for non-saboteurs the provision of effort, regardless of its size, always
poses the risk of losing the tournament for sure if the opponent engages in sabotage.
By contrast, opting for sabotage oneself makes it much more likely to win the tour-
nament. Even if the opponent engages in sabotage as well, the chance to win the
tournament still amounts to fifty percent in this case. At the same time, even the
loser prize exceeds the costs associated with sabotage, so that sabotaging alone can
never lead to a loss. Therefore, and because the additional provision of effort cannot
improve a saboteur’s chances of winning the tournament, it is optimal for her to only
provide minimal effort in the tournament.
The corresponding equilibrium strategy of rational and selfish individuals in the
two-stage game is thus characterized by i) sabotage (s∗ = 1), ii) minimal effort
(e∗ = 1) and iii) minimal transfer payments or point allocations (t∗ = p∗ = 0),




The behavioral predictions may change considerably and in particular differ between
both main treatments if subjects are no longer assumed to be pure money maximizers
but take additional aspects in their decision-making process into account. Possibly
different behavior under vertical and lateral promotions may be due to the fact that,
while there is sufficient scope for status, reputation or common-history-based social
concerns to come into play in treatment Vertical, these are completely ruled out in
Lateral because participants have no information about the tournament behavior
of their new gift-exchange partner.
For the sake of clarity, I will henceforth focus only on the case of individuals
with reciprocal preferences.10 More precisely, the following predictions are based
on a simple model of action-based reciprocity in the spirit of Cox et al. (2007).
The model itself as well as detailed derivations of the predictions are provided in
Appendix B.2, while this section rather concentrates on building some intuition for
the predicted behavioral differences between treatments.
With reciprocal preferences, i.e., the desire to reward friendly actions and to
punish hostile actions, an agent’s behavior in the gift-exchange game may now clearly
depend on her principal’s transfer payment choice. This is true both for treatment
Vertical and treatment Lateral. The positive relationship between principals’
and agents’ generosity, which is generally documented in gift-exchange games (see,
e.g., Fehr et al. 1993, 1997, Gächter & Falk 2002, Falk 2007), is also predicted by my
model of action-based reciprocity. Moreover, if two reciprocators interact with each
other in both stages, as is true in Vertical, the agent’s and the principal’s second-
stage behavior may additionally be affected by what has happened in the previous
stage. By contrast, a reciprocity-driven spillover between stages is not possible if
a subject interacts with two different individuals in the promotion tournament and
the subsequent gift-exchange game, as subjects do in Lateral. In this case, both
games will rather be regarded as independent.11
10Different assumptions, like individuals incorporating reputational concerns in their decision
making or responding to status in the gift-exchange game, would be reasonable as well and possibly
lead to different predictions. However, such considerations shall not constitute the focus of this
paper.
11Please note that throughout this paper I speak of reciprocity in its narrower sense. If, for
example, I additionally considered indirect reciprocity here (see, e.g., Alexander 1989, Nowak &
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The correspondingly different behavioral relevance of reciprocity concerns in
Vertical and Lateral is also reflected in the predictions that result in the presence
of reciprocal preferences. A particularly important role is thereby attached to the
opponent’s sabotage choice, which is reasonable to be treated as the most impor-
tant determinant of an individual’s attitude and subsequent behavior towards the
other person. In the gift-exchange game of treatment Vertical, a participant will
therefore behave kindly towards the other person only if this latter has refrained
from sabotage in the tournament. Otherwise, even a generous transfer payment
cannot fully overcome the negative act of sabotaging. This assumption is in line
with the findings of Baumeister et al. (2001) who document that bad experiences
have psychologically more impact than good ones. By contrast, in the gift-exchange
game of treatment Lateral, an individual cannot condition her behavior on the
other player’s sabotage choice because she does not have any information about
it. An agent with reciprocal preferences in Lateral therefore conditions her point
allocation only on the transfer payment received, with the number of points chosen
increasing in the generosity of the transfer payment.
In line with the notion of backward induction, each subject anticipates her own
as well as other subjects’ future behavior already when taking her decision in the
promotion tournament. Since in terms of utility it shall pay off to become a principal,
subject to appropriate behavior in the gift-exchange game, participants will always
try to win the tournament. In Lateral, the most adequate way to reach this
goal is to provide minimal effort and to engage in sabotage because the decision for
sabotage cannot influence the continuation values from the gift-exchange game but
improves the chance of winning the tournament and obtaining a higher payoff (see
Appendix B.2). Tournament behavior of individuals with reciprocal preferences is
in treatment Lateral thus predicted to coincide with the behavior of pure money
maximizers. The crucial difference between both predictions, however, consists in the
Sigmund 1998, Wedekind & Milinski 2000, Engelmann & Fischbacher 2009), individuals’ behavior
would no longer have to be independent in both stages of the lateral promotion regime. However,
the inclination to reciprocate the other subject’s (supposed) tournament behavior is still likely to
be higher in Vertical than in Lateral because i) one has experienced the gift-exchange partner’s
tournament behavior personally and ii) knows this behavior for sure, while reactions in Lateral
may be weaker in order to correct for the fact that a participant is always uncertain about the
gift-exchange partner’s actual tournament behavior.
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fact that non-minimal transfer payments and point allocations are only possible with
reciprocators. The corresponding equilibrium strategy of individuals with reciprocal
preferences is under the lateral job promotion scheme therefore characterized by
i) sabotage (s∗/Lat = 1), ii) minimal effort (e∗/Lat = 1) and iii) possibly non-minimal
transfer payments or point allocations (t∗/Lat, p∗/Lat ≥ 0), respectively, which depend
on the exact parameters in subjects’ utility functions.
Because a reciprocator has no incentive to behave kindly towards a person by
whom she has previously been sabotaged, the continuation values of both participants
are less or equal to zero if at least one of them engages in sabotage. Consequently,
in the presence of individuals with reciprocal preferences one possible equilibrium
strategy in Vertical coincides with that of pure money-maximizers. As long as
the continuation values that would result if both opponents refrained from sabo-
tage are sufficiently high, also a second equilibrium may exist. In this equilibrium,
participants have a strategic incentive to refrain from sabotage in the tournament
due to the expected reciprocity-driven cooperation in the subsequent gift-exchange
game. Because of its Pareto dominance, subjects may prefer to coordinate on this
“no sabotage” equilibrium. The corresponding equilibrium strategy of individuals
with reciprocal preferences is under the vertical job promotion scheme thus charac-
terized by i) refraining from sabotage (s∗/Vert = 0), ii) possibly non-minimal effort
(e∗/Vert ≥ 1) and iii) possibly non-minimal transfer payments or point allocations
(t∗/Vert, p∗/Vert ≥ 0), respectively, which depend on the exact parameters in subjects’
utility functions.
2.4 Results
To test for potential differences in individuals’ behavior under vertical and lateral
promotions, respectively, I focus on subjects’ tournament decisions first, before I
consider their behavior in the subsequent gift-exchange game. Finally, I expand the
analysis to treatment GE-Only to identify how the previous experience of compe-
tition impacts on participants’ gift-exchange game behavior.
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2.4.1 The Promotion Tournament
Participants’ tournament behavior consists of two choices - one with respect to sabo-
tage and another with respect to effort. The following analysis therefore compares
vertical and lateral job promotions along both dimensions. Since treatment differen-
ces are primarily predicted to arise in the sabotage domain, let us focus on subjects’
sabotage decisions first. Figure 2.2 depicts the proportion of individuals opting for
sabotage in treatment Lateral and treatment Vertical, respectively.
















The figure shows that subjects sabotage their tournament opponent significantly
less often if both will also interact in the subsequent gift-exchange game than if they
will face a different individual there. While more than 60% of subjects sabotage their
opponent in Lateral,12 the fraction of saboteurs amounts to only 40% in Vertical
(Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.066).13 Sabotage thus occurs more than 50% more often
under the lateral than under the vertical job promotion regime. The robustness of
this treatment effect is confirmed by the Probit regressions in Table 2.4. Further-
more, column (2) reveals that also gender and individual competitiveness influence
the decision to sabotage in a significant way. More precisely, males and more com-
petitive individuals are more likely to engage in sabotage. While a one-point increase
in a subject’s competitiveness, which may range from 0 to 20, on average increases
12This fraction is somewhat smaller than the 75% found in Falk et al. (2008) who employ a very
similar tournament setting.
13Unless specified otherwise, all tests reported in this paper are two-sided.
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the probability to engage in sabotage by 3%, being female reduces this probability
on average by 16%. By contrast, exposure to the vertical promotion scheme makes a
subject on average 21% less likely to sabotage her tournament opponent. The treat-
ment effect is thus not only statistically significant but also economically relevant,
as it exceeds the gender effect by one third.















Pseudo R2 0.032 0.147
Notes: This table shows average marginal effects from a Probit model (stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses). The dependent variable is a dummy
variable indicating whether a subject has engaged in sabotage (s = 1) or
refrained from it (s = 0). The variable “Vertical” is a dummy variable
indicating treatment Vertical. “Competitiveness” is a subject’s score on
the Competitiveness Index of Smither & Houston (1992), ranging between
0 (low competitiveness) and 20 (high competitiveness). “Gender” is 1 for
female and 0 for male. “CRT” is a subject’s score on the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test of Frederick (2005), ranging between 0 (low cognitive reflection)
and 3 (high cognitive reflection). Significance levels are denoted as follows:
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The reported findings demonstrate that the treatment difference in subjects’ sabo-
tage behavior is qualitatively in line with the predictions in Section 2.3.2. Moreover,
my results contribute a novel aspect to the literature on gender effects in tourna-
ments, since they reveal that men, who are usually found to exhibit more competitive
behavior than women (see, e.g., Gneezy et al. 2003, Gneezy & Rustichini 2004, Dato
53
& Nieken 2013) and also report a higher level of competitiveness in the ex-post
questionnaire to this study (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.006), are more likely
to engage in sabotage than women even if I control for the individual degree of
competitiveness.
Let us now turn to participants’ effort choices in the tournament. First, taking the
already discussed sabotage choices as given, I find that saboteurs and non-saboteurs
differ significantly in this second dimension of tournament behavior. More precisely,
saboteurs provide much less effort than non-saboteurs, with the large majority of
saboteurs only providing minimal effort, as predicted in Section 2.3.14 This pattern
emerges both in treatment Lateral and treatment Vertical (Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests, p ≤ 0.005).15 Second, when comparing subjects’ tournament effort between
treatments, I find that the average effort level in Vertical exceeds the one in Late-
ral by more than 20% (eVert = 3.8 vs. eLat = 3.2).16 While non-parametric tests
fall short of identifying a statistically significant treatment difference with respect
to subjects’ effort choices (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.297), the coefficient of
the treatment dummy reaches significance in the corresponding OLS regression in
Table 2.5 if I control for the same explanatory variables as in the Probit regressions
for sabotage mentioned above.17
Aggregating these findings with respect to individuals’ tournament behavior, I
obtain the following result:
Result 1. Under vertical promotions, subjects refrain substantially more often from
sabotage than under lateral promotions. Under vertical promotions, subjects rather
rely on effort to win the promotion tournament.
To identify whether the behavioral patterns just described also have consequences
for the degree of social efficiency that is attained under vertical and lateral promo-
tions, respectively, I consider several suitable efficiency measures. It is straightfor-
ward to first compare sabotage frequencies between treatments. Subjects’ behavior
is considered as socially more efficient the less they engage in sabotage. The reason
14That subjects may substitute from effort to sabotage is also observed by Falk et al. (2008).
15For a graphical illustration, see Figure 2.4 in Appendix B.1.
16Histograms of subjects’ effort choices in both treatments are provided in Figure 2.5 in Ap-
pendix B.1.
17Qualitatively similar results are obtained when using Tobit regressions.
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Adjusted R2 0.004 0.104
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates from a linear regression model
(standard errors are given in parentheses). The dependent variable is a sub-
ject’s effort choice, ranging between 1 and 10. The variable “Vertical”
is a dummy variable indicating treatment Vertical. “Competitiveness”
is a subject’s score on the Competitiveness Index of Smither & Houston
(1992), ranging between 0 (low competitiveness) and 20 (high competitive-
ness). “Gender” is 1 for female and 0 for male. “CRT” is a subject’s score
on the Cognitive Reflection Test of Frederick (2005), ranging between 0 (low
cognitive reflection) and 3 (high cognitive reflection). Significance levels are
denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
is that sabotage i) destroys an other participant’s output, while being costly for
the saboteur, and ii) may also discourage participants from exerting effort in the
first place (see, e.g., Carpenter et al. 2010, Gürtler et al. 2013). According to this
first efficiency measure, social efficiency is substantially higher in Vertical because
there sabotage only occurs in 40% of all cases, compared to 60% in Lateral. The
second efficiency measure considers thefraction of groups in which both competi-
tors refrain from sabotage. While in Vertical in one in three groups no subject
engages in sabotage, in Lateral seven in eight groups consist of at least one sabo-
teur. Naturally, this also has consequences for average output, my third efficiency
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measure. Average output in Lateral represents only half of the output generated
in Vertical (yLat = 1 vs. yVert = 2.06; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.023). The
final efficiency measure that I look at in the tournament stage is output per unit of
costs incurred. While this measure is equal to 0.05 in Lateral, it takes on a value
of 0.11 in Vertical. This increase of more than 100% constitutes a statistically
significant treatment difference (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.028).18 I summarize
these findings as follows:
Result 2. Individuals’ tournament behavior is socially more efficient under vertical
than under lateral promotions.
2.4.2 The Gift-Exchange Game
To analyze subjects’ behavior in the gift-exchange game, I mainly compare the
choices of i) principals and ii) agents between Vertical and Lateral. In addi-
tion, I present several results that can be observed at the more individual level. The
comparison of subjects’ gift-exchange game behavior in the main treatments to that
in treatment GE-Only is drawn at the very end of this section.
Starting with principals’ behavior in the gift-exchange game, I observe that in
both main treatments the chosen transfer payments are relatively dispersed, covering
the total possible range between 0 and 100 (see Figure 2.6 in Appendix B.1). While
in Lateral principals on average offer a payment of 53.8 to their agent, the average
transfer payment in Vertical amounts to 46.9. The corresponding treatment
difference is statistically insignificant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.360). The
same holds true when testing for the equality of both transfer payment distributions
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.183).
Investigating the determinants of principals’ payment choices in more detail, the
OLS regressions in Table 2.6 do not only confirm the absence of a treatment effect but
also reveal that under vertical promotions saboteurs offer particularly low transfer
payments. This finding is in line with my model of action-based reciprocity, because
sabotaging principals in Vertical, who expect that sabotaging impacts negatively
18Note that the reported test statistic is based on a subset of all participants because the cor-
responding efficiency measure is not defined if a subject does not incur any costs. This holds true
for five and six participants in Lateral and Vertical, respectively.
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on the generosity of their opponent’s subsequent point choice, should indeed offer
zero or at least lower transfer payments than non-saboteurs. The comparison of
columns (1) and (2) shows that this effect gets even stronger if additional individual
characteristics are controlled for. By contrast, the opponent’s sabotage decision has
in none of the treatments a significant effect on principals’ transfer payment offers.19
Table 2.6: Principals’ transfer payment choices














Individual Controls No Yes
Observations 48 48
R2 0.116 0.311
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.147
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates from a linear regression model (stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses). The dependent variable is the transfer pay-
ment a principal directs to her agent. The variable “Vertical” is a dummy vari-
able indicating treatment Vertical. “Sabotagei” and “Sabotagej” are dummy
variables indicating a principal’s own sabotage decision and the sabotage deci-
sion of her tournament opponent, respectively. “Vertical × Sabotagei” and
“Vertical × Sabotagej” are the corresponding interactions between treatment
and sabotage choice. Individual controls include age, gender, CRT score and the
interaction between gender and sabotage choice. Significance levels are denoted
as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Turning to agents’ behavior in the gift-exchange game, I find that the points
agents allocate to their principal do not significantly differ between Vertical and
19Qualitatively similar results are obtained when using Tobit regressions.
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Lateral (pVert = pLat = 1.5; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.765). The absence
of a treatment effect with respect to agents’ point choices also becomes visible
in Figure 2.7 in Appendix B.1 and is further supported by the OLS regression in
Table 2.7 in Appendix B.1. Given that principals’ transfer payments have already
been shown to be similar in both treatments, the similarity of agents’ point choices is
not surprising per se. However, due to the higher frequency of sabotage in Lateral,
we rather could have expected agents to exhibit more aggressive, i.e., selfish beha-
vior in Lateral, irrespective of the offered transfer payment. Although Spearman’s
ρ is indeed lower in Lateral than in Vertical (ρLat = 0.37 vs. ρVert = 0.67),
the regression reveals that in both treatments an agent’s point choice is only sig-
nificantly affected by her principal’s transfer payment, and not by the interactions
between treatment and transfer payment or sabotage, respectively.20
Hence, while substantial treatment differences in participants’ behavior exist in
the tournament stage, individuals’ gift-exchange game behavior does not significantly
differ between Vertical and Lateral. This is synthesized in the following result:
Result 3. Principals offer similar transfer payments to their agent under the vertical
and the lateral job promotion setting. The same holds true for agents’ corresponding
point allocations.
I conjecture that the described behavioral patterns in Vertical and Lateral
are caused by a discrepancy between subjects’ anticipated and their actually exhibited
reciprocal inclination. More precisely, the substantially higher sabotage frequency
in treatment Lateral suggests that participants indeed anticipate differently pro-
nounced reciprocal inclinations in both treatments. It is possibly only because of
this behavioral adjustment to the different potential of reciprocity under vertical
and lateral promotions that subjects’ choices in the gift-exchange game do eventu-
ally not significantly differ between both treatments. Otherwise, i.e., if participants
in Vertical had sabotaged as often as subjects in Lateral, gift-exchange game
behavior might have been substantially less cooperative in Vertical.
After having analyzed subjects’ behavior and its efficiency under vertical and late-
ral promotions separately for each type of interaction, it is crucial to also evaluate
20Qualitatively similar results are obtained when using Tobit regressions.
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more generally whether the combination of competitive and cooperative incentive
schemes should be preferred over the separate play of both single-stage environments.
More precisely, I am interested in whether the previous experience of competition im-
pacts negatively on subjects’ gift-exchange game behavior. To answer this question,
I conducted an additional treatment, GE-Only, in which participants only played
the gift-exchange game. The tournament stage was absent.
Since subjects in GE-Only are endowed with the average income that princi-
pals in the main treatments possessed after the tournament, I can directly compare
principals’ transfer payments between treatments. With average payments of 46.5
in GE-Only and 46.9 and 53.8 in Vertical and Lateral, respectively, no statis-
tically significant difference can be identified (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p > 0.359).
The same holds true for the number of points that agents allocate to their prin-
cipal (pGE-O = 2.9 vs. pVert = pLat = 1.5; Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p > 0.198).
These insights are underlined by Figure 2.3, contrasting subjects’ gift-exchange game
behavior in GE-Only to that in the main treatments. Moreover, also in GE-Only
there exists a positive correlation between both variables, with Spearman’s ρ of 0.63
(p = 0.003) lying between those found in Lateral and Vertical. These findings
are summarized in the following result:
Result 4. The experience of competition does not seem to alter subjects’ behavior in
the gift-exchange game.
In particular, my results thus show that job promotions do not influence subjects’
behavior negatively, as would have been predicted for example by a preference for
consistency in acting competitively (see, e.g., Falk & Zimmermann 2011).21 In fact,
the opposite holds true, especially if one refers to vertical promotions. The reason
is that, both according to the model predictions and the analysis carried out in this
section, the efficiency of participants’ tournament behavior in Vertical exceeds
the one in Lateral, while there are no significant treatment differences in subjects’
gift-exchange game behavior.
21If they had occurred, behavioral differences between GE-Only and the main treatments could
also have been the result of emotions or mood, because these are presumably much more pronounced
after the experience of competition and may carry over to the gift-exchange stage. For studies on
mood and emotions, see, e.g., Liberman et al. (1994), Bosman & van Winden (2002), Fehr &
Gächter (2002), Capra (2004), Kirchsteiger et al. (2006) and Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007).
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Figure 2.3: Transfer payments offered by principals and points allocated by agents, main


























Graphs by competitive experience
2.5 Conclusion
Promotions are in most hierarchical organizations not viewed as end in themselves.
Besides providing incentives in the form of higher hierarchical positions and better
pay for well-performing employees, a probably even more important objective of
promotions consists in ensuring the proper functioning of a firm or organization also
in the future. To reach this second objective, it is decisive that also under the new
hierarchy individuals interact with each other efficiently. Since the corresponding
multi-stage nature of job promotions, which is in particular characterized by the
sequential experience of competitive and cooperative incentives, had so far been
largely neglected in the economic literature, this paper studied behavior in such
promotion settings with the help of controlled laboratory experiments.
My results demonstrate the importance of taking behavioral aspects like social
preferences into account when implementing a particular job promotion scheme. In
the promotion setting studied in this paper, especially reciprocal preferences may
have been responsible for the observed treatment differences. Along these lines, my
results suggest that in the presence of reciprocal preferences vertical promotions have
particularly desirable properties. As compared to lateral promotions, vertical promo-
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tions were able to mitigate sabotage, which usually constitutes a major drawback of
tournaments (e.g., Chen 2005, Harbring et al. 2007, Carpenter et al. 2010). Further-
more, the previous experience of competition had no detrimental effects on behavior
in a cooperative environment, as revealed by the control treatment.
My findings bear practical implications with respect to the future design of pro-
motions and career paths within firms and other organizations. More precisely, firms
that wish to provide incentives with the help of promotion tournaments and know
that contestants may engage in sabotage, should contemplate having competitors
continue to interact. My results suggest that by implementing such a vertical pro-
motion scheme, firms may generate substantial additional gains from a reduction
of unproductive sabotage activities, relative to the case of lateral promotions. Also
several positive indirect effects may go along with the proper selection of a firm’s
job promotion regime. A less hostile working atmosphere without sabotage might,
for example, lead to a higher identification of employees with their firm and to lower
turnover rates, which may further support the transition to a more stable, more
cooperative, and, hence, also more productive working atmosphere.22
A number of previous papers have studied tournaments with sabotage in settings
consisting of one single stage. These papers have generally identified sabotage as a
major drawback of tournaments since the opportunity to sabotage is frequently used
and, in addition, discourages many subjects from providing productive effort (e.g.,
Lazear 1989, Falk et al. 2008, Carpenter et al. 2010). This problem was found to be
particularly severe if people are additionally required to cooperate while competing
for promotion (e.g., Lazear 1992, Baron & Kreps 1999). Lazear (1992) therefore
postulated that “individuals who need to cooperate with one another should not be
grouped into the same tournament” (p. 28). In view of my findings it is not clear
whether this postulation would still be valid if the setting of Lazear was extended
by a second cooperative stage in which competitors continued to interact with each
other. For example, the anticipation of future interaction with the same person might
mitigate sabotage and increase productive effort also in the modified framework.
Further research is also needed with respect to the role that ability might play
22Additional advantages of vertical promotions, which did not constitute the focus of this study,
inter alia include the preservation of team or department specific knowledge as well as the reduction
of uncertainty with respect to the working standards set by the new boss.
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in two-stage job promotions. This holds particularly true for environments in which
people take real effort and sabotage decisions. Furthermore, the use of real-effort
tasks or field studies constitutes already in itself a straightforward next step, given
that the setting studied in this paper is empirically motivated. Also studies that
concentrate, both at the institutional and individual level, on the driving forces of
behavioral spillovers between games promise to be interesting for future research.
In this regard, it might be particularly telling to identify factors that cause antici-
patory behavioral effects because these have so far only received little attention in
the literature. At the same time, a more profound knowledge of the determinants of
potential interdependencies between different incentives schemes can help to design
multi-stage environments more intelligently in the future. Irrespective of the envi-
ronment of interest, the findings of this paper underline the importance of taking
social preferences into account when implementing or designing incentive schemes.
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B Appendix
B.1 Figures and Tables

























Graphs by sabotage decision
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Table 2.7: Agents’ point choices
Dependent variable: Points allocated
(1) (2) (3)
Vertical 0.071 0.180 −0.527
(0.510) (0.553) (1.516)
Payment 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.023∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Sabotagej −0.743 −0.828 −0.612
(0.605) (0.623) (1.159)
Vertical × Payment 0.016
(0.015)
Vertical × Sabotagej −0.113
(1.459)
Constant 0.444 −0.942 −0.382
(0.768) (1.571) (2.136)
Individual Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 48 48 48
R2 0.345 0.374 0.392
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.282 0.267
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates from a linear regression model (standard errors are
given in parentheses). The dependent variable is the number of points an agent allocates to her
principal. The variable “Vertical” is a dummy variable indicating treatment Vertical. “Pay-
ment” indicates the transfer payment that has previously been directed to the agent. “Sabotagej”
is a dummy variable indicating the sabotage decision of an agent’s tournament opponent. “Ver-
tical × Payment” and “Vertical × Sabotagej” are the corresponding interactions between
treatment and transfer payment or sabotage choice, respectively. Individual controls include
age, gender and CRT score. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B.2 A Model of Action-Based Reciprocity
The model of action-based reciprocity that I lay out in the following builds on the
job promotion setting of the experiment described in Section 2.2. It thereby extends
the model of Cox et al. (2007) by taking into account the behavior of two individuals
in two stages, explicitly allowing for interdependencies between both stages. In par-
ticular, it therefore allows me to analyze whether individuals with reciprocal prefe-
rences may behave differently under vertical and lateral promotions and whether the
corresponding behavioral predictions differ from those for purely money-maximizing
individuals.
Basic Setup of the Model
The model replicates the setting of job promotions employed in the experiment, as
consisting of a tournament with binary sabotage and a subsequent gift-exchange
game.
In the tournament stage, a subject is awarded the winner prize, wP = 90 >
30 = wA, if her output yi exceeds the output yj of her opponent. In the case
of a tie, the winner of the tournament is determined by random draw. Subjects
can affect their own output and that of their opponent by choosing an effort level,
e ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 10}, and by opting for or against sabotage, s ∈ {0, 1}.23 Output
is also influenced by the realization of a random error term, , which is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, 2] and captures output shocks or measurement error
of output. i and j are assumed to be i.i.d.. Formally, output is given by the function
yi = (ei+ i) · (1− sj). At the same time, both the provision of effort and sabotage is
costly for the contestants. While sabotage entails fixed costs of cs = 20, effort costs
are convex according to Table 2.8.
Table 2.8: Effort levels and costs of effort
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
With c(si) = cs · si, subject i’s payoff from the tournament stage is therefore





wP − c(ei)− c(si) if i wins the tournament
wA − c(ei)− c(si) if i loses the tournament.
(2.1)
In the gift-exchange stage, a tournament winner and a tournament loser interact
with each other in a gift-exchange game. Under vertical promotions these are the
same individuals that have already faced each other in the preceding tournament,
whereas under lateral promotions subjects encounter a different person. After being
informed about their own and their previous opponent’s tournament behavior, sub-
jects take sequential decisions. Tournament winners are in the roles of a principal
and have to choose a transfer payment, t ∈ [0, 100], that they want to direct to their
agent, which is a tournament loser matched to them. After having observed this
payment, each agent has to decide how many points, p ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 10}, to allocate
to her principal, from which this latter benefits with the factor v = 15. Agents’ costs
associated with the allocation of points are convex according to Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: Allocated points and costs of point allocation
p 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(p) 0 0.5 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
Principals’ and agents’ payoffs from the gift-exchange stage are therefore given
by:
pi2P = v · p− t (2.2)
pi2A = t− c(p). (2.3)
Hence, also incorporating the initial endowment of ω = 20, subjects’ expected
payoff from taking part in the experiment can be written as:
E[pii] = qi ·
(
wP + v · p− t
)
+ (1− qi) ·
(
wA + t− c(p)
)
+ ω − c(ei)− c(si), (2.4)
with qi ≥ 0 the probability that subject i wins the tournament.
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Modeling Reciprocity
In the following I describe how exactly reciprocity is incorporated in the present
model of job promotions. However, before I introduce you to the concrete form of
reciprocity, I would like to emphasize that this model is not intended to focus on
closely related concepts like indirect reciprocity (see, e.g., Alexander 1989, Nowak
& Sigmund 1998, Wedekind & Milinski 2000, Seinen & Schram 2006, Engelmann &
Fischbacher 2009) that might be relevant as well. In the context of lateral promotions
it would for example be possible that an agent who has been sabotaged before may
allocate only the minimal number of points to her newly matched principal in the
gift-exchange game because she holds the (possibly incorrect) belief that also her
principal has to be a saboteur since otherwise he would not have been able to win his
own tournament. However, such reasoning of indirect reciprocity is explicitly ruled
out here to keep the model as simple as possible, so that it can focus exclusively on
“direct” reciprocity, i.e., on what is usually understood under the term reciprocity in
its narrower sense.
In analogy to the concept of the “emotional state function” in Cox et al. (2007), the
degree to which a subject behaves reciprocally is henceforth modeled with the help of
the reciprocity function θ(·). More precisely, one’s inclination to behave reciprocally
is influenced by whether one has been treated kindly or unkindly by another person
before. The reciprocity function θ(·) does not only increase in the other subject’s
kindness, but also indicates how much one cares about the other subject’s payoff. In
multi-stage environments like job promotions it therefore also determines individuals’
future behavior. Consequently, the higher a participant’s reciprocity function after
the tournament, both in the positive or the negative domain, the more reciprocal
will be her behavior in the subsequent gift-exchange game.
In the following I will mainly focus on the setting of vertical job promotions.
The reason is that it impacts in more complex ways on subjects’ reciprocity than
the setting of lateral job promotions because the information about one’s oppo-
nent’s tournament behavior is uninformative under lateral promotions as one faces
a different person in the subsequent gift-exchange game. However, the model of ver-
tical job promotions whose components I present in the following contains i) lateral
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job promotions with reciprocal individuals and ii) job promotions with pure money
maximizers as special cases.
When modeling subjects’ reciprocity functions, it seems natural to use different
functions for agents and principals. The reason is that an agent observes both her
principal’s tournament behavior as well as his transfer payment which may both
affect the agent’s reciprocal inclination when deciding about her action in the gift-
exchange game. A principal, in contrast, only observes her agent’s tournament beha-
vior before she has to choose her desired transfer payment. At this point it is
important to note that, although all (up to three) observable choices may affect a
participant’s reciprocal inclination, I do not incorporate all of them in her reciprocity
function in order to keep the model tractable. More precisely, in addition to the prin-
cipal’s transfer payment I only include the opponent’s sabotage choice because this
latter is more decisive for the tournament outcome and therefore also psychologically
more important than the opponent’s effort choice. In the spirit of Cox et al. (2007),
the corresponding reciprocity functions of agents and principals are thus given by:
θA(sP , t) = a
A · (1sP=0 − 1sP=1)+ bA · t− t0tmax − t0
θP (sA) = a
P · (1sA=0 − 1sA=1), (2.5)
with aA, aP , bA > 0, aA > bA and t0 ≥ 0. While sA, sP , t and tmax depict agents’
and principals’ sabotage choice as well as principals’ actual and maximal transfer
payment, respectively, t0 constitutes the transfer payment that is considered as ‘fair’.
More precisely, I henceforth assume t0 = 50 because i) heuristics could lead subjects
to consider this transfer payment as fair (because it is exactly in the middle of
the possible payment range) and ii) actual transfer payments in the experiment on
average coincide with t0 = 50.24 Furthermore, for the sake of comparability, the
absolute value of both θi is assumed to be less than 1, directly implying aP < 1 and
aA + bA < 1.
Depending on the value of t, the second term in agents’ reciprocity function can
24Although, inter alia, status and entitlement have been identified as major determinants of
whether a given allocation decision is perceived as fair or not (see, e.g., Hoffman et al. 1994, Fahr
& Irlenbusch 2000, Albrecht et al. 2013), I abstract from these and related issues here in order to
keep the model tractable.
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either become positive or negative. The same holds true for the expression in paran-
theses in both players’ reciprocity function. Its sign is positive if one’s opponent does
not engage in sabotage, otherwise it is negative. Subjects’ reciprocal inclination, as
depicted by the formulas in (2.5), can thus either be positive or negative. The addi-
tional restriction aA > bA implies that an agent’s reciprocal inclination is influenced
more strongly by her principal’s sabotage decision than his payment offer. This
assumption is in line with the findings of Baumeister et al. (2001) who document
that bad experiences have psychologically more impact than good ones.
It is well-established that reciprocators do not only care about their own payoff,
pi1i + pi2i, but, depending on their reciprocal inclination θi(·), also about how nicely
they behave towards others. In the context of vertical promotions, this means that,
if the person a subject is matched to has treated her so kindly that her reciprocity
function is positive, the subject assigns positive weight θi to those of her actions that
benefit the other person. Analogously, if the participant’s θi is negative, behaving
nicely towards the other person reduces her own utility. Finally, if θi is equal to zero,
the subject does not at all care about the other person’s payoff and therefore acts as
a pure money maximizer.
Because subjects’ utility functions should fulfill all the requirements presented
above, in my model they are assumed to be of the following form:
Ui =









· γ2 if i loses the
tournament
UPi = wP − c(ei)− c(si) + v · p− t+ θP ·
(
δ · (1− si)+ t) if i wins the
tournament,
(2.6)
with suitable weights γ1, γ2, δ > 0.
Since there is uncertainty ex ante about whether one will win the tournament
and therefore act as a principal in the gift-exchange game, subjects maximize the
following expected utility:
EUi = qi · UPi + (1− qi) · UAi . (2.7)
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As we will see in the next section, this expected utility does not only depend on a
subject’s own choices in stage 1 and stage 2, but also on the realizations of the error
term and the tournament and gift-exchange choices of the person(s) the subject is
matched with. The other participants’ decisions as well as the error term realizations
impact on a subject’s expected utility both via the probability of winning and her
reciprocity function.
Before I proceed to the derivation of the predictions for individuals with reciprocal
preferences as well as for pure money maximizers under both promotion schemes, I
briefly explain how the setup described above changes if I consider i) lateral instead
of vertical promotions or ii) rational and selfish individuals instead of reciprocators.
Since, under the lateral job promotion regime, subjects are rematched after the
tournament stage, they are unaware of their new partner’s tournament behavior.
Hence, an individual’s reciprocal inclination can no longer be affected by the other
subject’s sabotage choice, i.e., aP = aA = 0. Whereas a principal, thus, remains
completely uninformed about the kindness of her agent, an agent can still base her
gift-exchange game behavior on the generosity of her principal’s transfer payment.
Under the lateral job promotion regime, the reciprocity functions of reciprocal agents
and principals are therefore given by




The change in individuals’ reciprocity function naturally affects their utility func-
tions as well. More precisely, since a subject’s sabotage choice does no longer affect
the reciprocal inclination of her gift-exchange partner, there is no need to feel regret
about having engaged in sabotage when facing a kind partner. Therefore, under













By contrast, if individuals are rational and selfish, they will exhibit no reciprocal
behavior. Their reciprocity functions are hence equal to zero, i.e., θA/0 = θP/0 = 0,
implying that also their utility is not at all influenced by mutually generous actions.






i = wA − c(ei)− c(si) + t− c(p) if i loses the tournament
U
P/0
i = wP − c(ei)− c(si) + v · p− t if i wins the tournament.
(2.10)
Predictions
In the following, I derive the predictions of the model introduced above, focusing
on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. However, it is important to note that,
due to the many possible combinations of values the up to six free parameters in
subjects’ reciprocity and utility functions (aP , aA, bA, γ1, γ2, δ) can take, no univer-
sally valid predictions can be obtained. My aim is therefore to at least prove that
the different job promotion schemes may well induce different behavior. Hence, I
set the six free parameters at reasonable values to derive the behavioral predictions
that would result for this particular parameter constellation. In total, I distinguish
three different cases: First, I focus on the behavioral predictions for individuals with
reciprocal preferences in vertical job promotions. Afterwards, I determine the pre-
dictions for reciprocators in lateral job promotions. The predictions concerning the
job promotion behavior of rational and selfish individuals are derived at the very end
of this section.
Reciprocators in vertical job promotions
Using the reciprocity and utility functions in (2.5) and (2.6), I solve the present two-
stage game by backward induction, starting with agents’ decision on the number
of points they want to allocate to their principal in the gift-exchange game. More
precisely, agents maximize their utility from the second stage by choosing the optimal
number of points, p, taking all previous decisions as given. Agents’ corresponding
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objective function is thus given by25
OFA = t−c(p)+
(











At this point two cases have to be distinguished because agents’ utility function
differs, depending on whether their principal has previously engaged in sabotage or
not:
Firstly, if sP = 1, then OFA = t−c(p)+
(−aA+bA · t−t0
tmax−t0
) ·(γ1 ·(1−sA)+p) ·γ2.
Since this objective function is decreasing in p due to aA > bA ≥ bA · t−t0
tmax−t0 , agents
allocate the minimal number of points to their principal, i.e., p∗ = pmin = 0, if they
have been sabotaged before. This reaction does not depend on the transfer payment
an agent receives.
Secondly, if sP = 0, then OFA = t− c(p)+
(
aA+ bA · t−t0
tmax−t0
) · (γ1 · (1− sA)+ p) ·
γ2. In this case, agents may also allocate a non-minimal number of points to their
principal which, however, depends both on the received transfer payment and the
exact parameter values. All else being equal, agents are more willing to allocate a
high number of points in the gift-exchange game the more generous their principal’s
payment offer has been. If I consider for example a setting with aP = 0.6, aA = 0.41,
bA = 0.38, γ1 = 1, γ2 = 5 and δ = 30, which ensures that the weights associated
with the reciprocity-based component in subjects’ utility functions are reasonable,
for payment offers greater than or equal to 89, agents allocate p = 4 to their principal.
If payments lie in [62, 88], agents choose p = 3. Moreover, if t ∈ [36, 62], then p = 2,
and if t ∈ [10, 35], then p = 1. Finally, for payment offers smaller than 10, agents
respond with the minimal number of points, i.e., p = 0.
Principals anticipate agents’ reactions to their payment offer as specified above
and maximize the objective function
OFP = v · p− t+ aP ·
(
1sA=0 − 1sA=1
) · (δ · (1− sP ) + t). (2.12)
Consequently, I have to distinguish three different cases, depending on principals’
and agents’ sabotage choices in the tournament:26
25The subscripts A and P indicate variables relating to an agent or a principal, respectively.
26The constellation that the agent has engaged in sabotage, while the principal has not, is
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Firstly, if both the principal and the agent have engaged in sabotage, principals
know that their agent will only choose p∗ = pmin = 0 and thus face the following
objective function: OFP = v · 0 − t − aP · t = −(1 + aP ) · t. Hence, due to aP > 0,
the optimal payment offer is the minimal one, i.e., t∗ = tmin = 0.
Secondly, if only the principal has decided to sabotage her opponent, the prin-
cipal again anticipates that her agent will choose p∗ = 0. Given the corresponding
objective function OFP = v · 0 − t + aP · t = (aP − 1) · t, the principal still finds it
optimal to offer nothing to the agent, i.e., t∗ = 0, since aP < 1 by assumption.
Finally, if both the agent and the principal have refrained from sabotage, the
principal knows that her agent will respond reciprocally to the offered transfer pay-
ment. With p∗ depending on t, t0, aA, bA, γ1 and γ2, as laid out above, the agent’s
objective function is given by: OFP = v · p∗(t, t0, aA, bA, γ1, γ2) − t + aP · (δ + t).
With the parameter values of the previous example I obtain that it is optimal for
the principal to choose the smallest payment at which the agent still assigns her four
instead of only three or less points, i.e., t∗ = 89 and p∗ = 4. Please note that this
prediction only holds for the parameter values assumed above and therefore would
change if one used different parameter values instead. However, it is much more
important at this point to realize the huge difference in subjects’ gift-exchange beha-
vior that depends on their previous sabotage choices. More precisely, while already
one competitor opting for sabotage suffices to bring about inefficient behavior in the
gift-exchange game, non-minimal transfer payments and point allocations can occur
if both competitors refrain from sabotage.
Given the parameter specifications and the corresponding second-stage behavior
of principals and agents outlined above, I can determine the continuation values
that agents and principals will obtain after the tournament stage in each of the three
possible cases. These continuation values are given by CV 11A = CV 11P = 0 if both
subjects have engaged in sabotage, by CV 01A = −γ1 · γ2 ·
(








aA+ bA · t∗−t0
tmax−t0
) · (γ1+ p∗) · γ2 and CV 00P = v · p∗− t∗+ aP · (δ+ t∗) if both subjects
have refrained from sabotage, respectively.27
obviously not feasible because the saboteur would in this case win the tournament and therefore
become a principal.
27The two-digit superscripts used here indicate whether in the respective scenario the considered
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When determining their optimal tournament behavior, subjects take not only
the immediate benefits and costs into account but also the resulting continuation
values. More precisely, they compare all possible sabotage-effort combinations with
respect to their expected utility and finally choose the combination with the highest
expected utility. Naturally, saboteurs will only provide minimal effort in the tour-
nament. This is due to the fact that, if the opponent opts for sabotage as well, the
winner is determined by chance, whereas if the other subject refrains from sabotage,
the saboteur will always win the tournament. In either case, providing more than
minimal effort does not affect the saboteur’s chances of winning the tournament and
is at the same time costly.
Since it is important that the tournament generates incentives to win it, one needs
to check for each of the three sabotage profiles whether the utility from winning the
tournament exceeds the utility from losing it. Exemplarily doing this for the already
considered parameter constellation, I obtain the following utilities:
a) U11A = wA − c(s) + CV 11A = 10; U11P = wP − c(s) + CV 11P = 70
b) U01A = wA − c(e) + CV 01A = −88.5− c(e); U10P = wP − c(s) + CV 10P = 70
c) U00A = wA−c(e)+CV 00A = 128.66−c(e); U00P = wP −c(e)+CV 00P = 132.4−c(e)
These comparisons confirm that in the considered setting individuals have an
incentive to win the tournament and take on the role of the principal. Moreover,
we see that refraining from sabotage does not only prevent the costly destruction of
output in the promotion tournament but also increases individuals’ earnings in the
gift-exchange game. It would thus be efficient if subjects abstained from sabotage in
the tournament.
To determine individuals’ actual tournament behavior, I calculate the best response
for each possible sabotage-effort combination of one’s opponent. I thereby take the
following information into account: In case that one participant decides to sabo-
tage, whereas the other one refrains from doing so, the saboteur (non-saboteur)
will act as the principal (agent) in the subsequent gift-exchange game, so that each
subject’s utility is straightforward to determine (see case b)). By contrast, if both
subject (first digit) and her opponent (second digit) have engaged in sabotage (=1) or refrained
from it (=0).
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individuals have opted for sabotage, each subject’s likelihood of winning the tour-
nament is equal to 0.5. The corresponding expected utilities of both subjects do
therefore coincide and are given as the equally weighted sum of agents’ and prin-
cipals’ utilities in case a), i.e., EU11A = EU
11
P = 0.5 · (10 + 70) = 40. Finally, if
both individuals refrain from sabotage, both effort choices and the realizations of
i and j determine the tournament winner. More precisely, if both subjects choose
the same effort level, the likelihood of winning the tournament is 0.5. By contrast,
if a subject chooses an effort level that exceeds the opponent’s effort level by one,
this likelihood rises to 7
8
. Finally, if her effort level is two or more units higher, she
wins the tournament with certainty. A deviation of more than two units is, how-
ever, not profitable since it is more costly than a deviation of exactly two units and
cannot further increase the winning probability. Depending on the actual difference
in effort, subjects’ expected utility is thus determined by weighting principals’ and
agents’ utilities in case c) with the corresponding winning and losing probabilities,
i.e., EU00i = Pr(yi > yj) · U00P + Pr(yj > yi) · U00A .
It is easy to see that both individuals engaging in sabotage and providing minimal
effort is always part of a symmetric equilibrium. However, depending on the exact
parameter specifications, there also exists a second symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies in which both subjects refrain from sabotage in the tournament. For
example, with the parameter values used so far, I obtain that mutual best responses
consist as well in refraining from sabotage and providing an effort of e = 1 in the
tournament.
In this concrete example, the two resulting symmetric Nash equilibria in pure
strategies of the vertical job promotion scheme with reciprocal individuals are thus
given by the action profiles
[(









s∗/Vert = 1, e∗/Vert = 1, [t∗/Vert =




s∗/Vert = 1, e∗/Vert = 1, [t∗/Vert = 0, p∗/Vert = 0]
)]
, respectively. Since
utilities and joint payoffs are strictly higher in the first equilibrium in which subjects
refrain from sabotage, it is reasonable to assume individuals to coordinate on the
Pareto-superior of the two equilibria. Given the parameter values as specified above,
reciprocators’ equilibrium strategy under the vertical job promotion scheme would
therefore be characterized by s∗/Vert = 0, e∗/Vert = 1, t∗/Vert = 89 and p∗/Vert = 4.
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Reciprocators in lateral job promotions
In analogy to the analysis under vertical job promotions, I start the analysis of lateral
job promotions with agents’ behavior in the gift-exchange game, making use of the
adjusted reciprocity and utility functions in (2.8) and (2.9). Agents try to maximize
their objective function, OFA = t − c(p) + bA · t−t0tmax−t0 · p · γ2, with respect to p. As
in the case of vertical promotions, agents are generally more willing to allocate a
high number of points to their principal the kinder this latter’s transfer payment
has been. However, since under lateral promotions a generous payment offer is the
only way to appeal to agents’ reciprocity and can no longer be supported by the
abstainment from sabotage, agents may reciprocate even high transfer payments
with only a small number of points. This happens, for example, also if the same
parameter constellation prevails that I considered above. For payment offers greater
than or equal to 90, agents allocate p = 2 to their principal, while they only choose
p = 1 or p = 0 if t ∈ [64, 89] or t ≤ 63, respectively. Given this strategy, principals
are, according to their objective function, OFP = v ·p−t, eventually better off if they
offer only the minimal transfer payment. In this case, both agents’ and principals’
continuation values are equal to zero.
Turning to subjects’ tournament behavior, it is evident that under the lateral job
promotion regime it is the strictly dominant strategy to engage in sabotage. The
reason is that second-stage payoffs cannot be influenced by individuals’ decisions in
the tournament as they are equal to zero either way. Consequently, each partici-
pant will sabotage her opponent in order to increase her chances of receiving the
higher winner prize. Furthermore, as I have already shown for the case of vertical
promotions, it is optimal for saboteurs not to provide any effort in the tournament.
With the parameter values as specified above, reciprocators’ equilibrium strategy
under the lateral job promotion scheme is hence characterized by s∗/Lat = 1, e∗/Lat =
1, t∗/Lat = 0 and p∗/Lat = 0.
Pure money maximizers
If individuals are rational and selfish, their reciprocal inclination is equal to zero, i.e.,
p∗/0 = pmin = 0, irrespective of other participants’ previous behavior as well as the
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vertical or lateral structure of the job promotion scheme. Hence, applying backward
induction as before, rational and selfish agents will only allocate the minimal number
of points in the gift-exchange game, irrespective of their principal’s payment offer.
Principals with the same characteristics anticipate this behavior and consequently
offer no more than the minimal transfer payment, i.e., t∗/0 = tmin = 0. Agents’ and
principals’ continuation values are thus equal to zero and do not at all depend on
their own or other participants’ behavior in the preceding tournament. For pure
money maximizers, it is consequently the strictly dominant strategy to engage in
sabotage and provide only minimal effort in the tournament because this maximizes
their chances of receiving the higher winner prize.
If we again consider the exemplary parameter specification used in the previous
sections, the equilibrium strategy of rational and selfish individuals is thus charac-
terized by s∗/0 = 1, e∗/0 = 1, t∗/0 = 0 and p∗/0 = 0.
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B.3 Instructions
Below is the English translation of the German instructions used in treatment Ver-
tical. Differences in the instructions in treatment Lateral are marked by square
brackets “[...]”. The instructions were adapted appropriately in treatment GE-Only
and are available from the author upon request.
General information
You are participating in a study on economic decision-making. If you read the fol-
lowing explanations carefully, you can earn a substantial amount of money. It is
therefore very important that you read these explanations carefully and understand
them.
The decisions you take during the study will be analyzed in an exclusively anonymous
way. This means that your decisions will never be related to your identity. During
the study no communication of any kind of is allowed. If you have any questions,
put a hand out of your booth. The experimenters will then come over and answer
your question in private, so that the other participants will not be disturbed.
During the study, all monetary amounts are presented in Taler. At the end of the
study, the Taler you have earned will be converted into Euro and paid out to you.
The conversion rate is 1 Taler = e0.05.
At the beginning of the study, every participant is endowed with 20 Taler. She
can spend these and possible additional revenues from the experiment to cover poten-
tially occurring costs.
The study consists of two different parts, which are separately presented to
you now. Please read these instructions carefully.
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Information on part one of the study
Every participant competes against an other randomly determined person in a tour-
nament. The consequences of winning or losing the tournament are twofold. On
the one hand, tournament winners and losers obtain different payoffs from the tour-
nament. On the other hand, the outcome of the tournament determines to which
role a participant is assigned in part two of the study. It holds:
Tournament winners
• earn the winner prize of 90 Taler and
• take the role of player A in part two of the study.
Tournament losers
• earn the winner prize of 30 Taler and
• take the role of player B in part two of the study.
The person that generates the highest output wins the tournament. Her
output - and thus her chances of winning the tournament - are affected by two dif-
ferent decisions: own effort and/or sabotage.
Own effort increases own output. More precisely, each unit of own effort gene-
rates one unit of output. If, for example, you choose an effort level of 3, your output
will increase by 3 units. You can select any effort level between 1 and 10. The choice
of an effort level entails costs. The higher the effort level chosen, the higher the
corresponding costs. The following table indicates the costs associated with each
possible effort choice.
Table 2.10: Costs of effort
effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
costs [in Taler] 0 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
Own output additionally depends on chance. For each participant, the computer
randomly determines a number between 0 and 2, which is rounded to four decimals
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(e.g. 0.103, 1.746, 0.955 etc.). Every number between 0 and 2 is drawn with equal
probability. Own output is eventually calculated as sum of own effort cho-
sen and random number drawn.
Furthermore you can influence the output of your opponent by opting for sabotage.
Sabotage reduces your opponent’s output (effort plus random number)
to 0. Opting for sabotage entails costs of 20 Taler.
If, for example, participants 1 and 2 compete against each other, the output of
participant 1 depends on the sabotage choice of participant 2 as follows:
a) if participant 2 opts for sabotage b) if participant 2 opts against sabotage
output of participant 1 output of participant 1
= 0 = effort of participant 1
+ random number of participant 1
After you and your opponent have taken the decisions with respect to effort and
sabotage and after the computer has drawn a random number for each of you, your
output is compared to that of your opponent. The participant with higher output
wins the tournament. In case of a tie, the winner of the tournament is determined
by an additional random draw.
Ignoring participants’ endowment, the incomes from part one of the study
are for tournament winners and losers given by:
income of tournament winner income of tournament loser
= winner prize (90) = loser prize (30)
– costs of effort – costs of effort
– costs of sabotage – costs of sabotage
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Immediately after this part of the study, all participants obtain the following infor-
mation:
a) whether they have won or lost the tournament, and which role (player A or
player B) they will thus take in part two of the study,
b) the decisions they themselves have taken with respect to effort and sabotage,
c) the decisions their opponent has taken with respect to effort and sabotage,
d) the income they possess after the tournament (= income from the tournament +
endowment).
Information on part two of the study
As already explained, tournament winners secure the role of player A, whereas tour-
nament losers take the role of player B. In part two of the study, every player A
faces exactly one player B, and every player B faces exactly one player A.
Players A and B take their decisions in the following order:
1. Player A directs a transfer payment between 0 and 100 Taler to the
corresponding player B.
2. Player B observes the transfer payment of player A and allocates between
0 and 10 points to player A.
The higher the number of points chosen, the more player A benefits in terms
of income. Player A receives 15 Taler per point that is allocated to
her by player B. For player B the allocation of points entails costs. The
higher the number of points chosen, the higher the corresponding costs. The
following table specifies the costs associated with each possible point choice.
Table 2.11: Costs of allocating points to player A
points allocated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
costs [in Taler] 0 0.5 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
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After player A and player B have taken their decisions, the resulting incomes from
this part of the study are calculated.
As described above, the income from part two of the study is for player A
and player B given by the following formulas:
income of player A = 15 * points allocated by player B – transfer payment
income of player B = transfer payment sent by player A – costs of point allocation
Please note: The groups of two that are randomly determined at the beginning
of the study will remain in place for both parts of the study. This means that
in part two of the study you will face the same participant with whom you have
already interacted in the tournament. Thus, during the whole study you will
interact with one and the same person. [Please note: The groups of two that
are randomly determined at the beginning of the study will only remain in place for
the tournament. This means that in part two of the study you will face a participant
with whom you have not interacted yet. Thus, during the whole study you will
interact with two different persons.]
Additional information on the study
Both parts just presented follow each other immediately. After you have taken your
decision in part two of the study, we will ask you to answer several questions. For
answering these questions honestly and conscientiously you will receive
an additional e3 at the end of the study. Afterwards, you will be informed
about your income from both parts of the study, which will be paid to you in private.
Before the actual study starts, we ask you to answer the control questions that
will appear on your screen in a few seconds. If you have additional questions, please
indicate this by raising your hand. Part one of the study will start as soon as all






Elinor Ostrom has contributed to our understanding of social dilemmas like no other
researcher before her, and the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 was an award well
deserved. In her outstanding lifework, she has identified key aspects that shape the
success of self-organization in mitigating social dilemmas. One of the most prominent
pieces of her work is certainly Ostrom (1990), which at the time of this writing has
been cited more than 16,000 times. Although not at the key of her analysis, already
in this book she refers to “the presence of participants with substantial leadership”
(Ostrom 1990, p. 188) as a factor that influences outcomes of collective actions. In a
more recent paper (Ostrom 2009), she presented a general framework for analyzing
sustainability of social-ecological systems. It included ten factors, with leadership
being one of them. In both instances, however, she pointed out that the presence or
absence of leadership (as well as of any other factor she identified being relevant, e.g.,
social norms) alone cannot explain observed differences in the success to overcome
social dilemmas. Instead, leadership must be seen in the context of the other factors
that shape the situation at hand.
In this spirit, our paper studies if leadership behavior and leadership effective-
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ness are affected by the institutional framing. It also sheds light on the stability
of cooperative behavior, measured at the individual level, between different frames.
The lab experiments that we use are partly based on a setup introduced by Elinor
Ostrom (Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj & Walker 2013). The design allows for a paired com-
parison of positive (give-some) and negative (take-some) frames (see also Andreoni
1995, Sonnemans et al. 1998, Park 2000 or Dufwenberg et al. 2011 for corresponding
simultaneous-move games). In the positive frame (treatment Give), subjects are
endowed and can give (contribute) something to the common pool. In the nega-
tive frame (treatment Take), the payoff functions and other basic elements of the
situation are exactly identical - with the exception that subjects are not endowed
but can take (withdraw) something from the common pool. The game is played
sequentially, with an entitled leader moving first and three followers, observing the
leader’s decision, moving second.1 On the second stage, we introduce a strategy-
method approach to exactly measure followers’ reactions to leaders’ decisions and
to cleanly compare these reactions between the institutional frames. By eliciting
followers’ decisions conditional on each possible action of the leader, we can classify
subjects into selfish types or conditional cooperators (with respect to the leader’s
decisions).
We find that leaders’ behavior, followers’ reactions and consequently the effective-
ness of the leadership institution are strongly influenced by the institutional frame.
Leaders under the positive frame on average contribute more than twice as much as
leaders under the negative frame leave in the common pool (12.67 tokens contributed
in Give vs. 6.17 tokens left in Take). With respect to followers’ behavior, we find
that the institutional framing substantially shapes the distribution of cooperation
types. While in Give 67% of followers can be classified as conditional cooperators
and 14% as free riders, in Take only about one third of followers exhibit condi-
tionally cooperative behavior, and an even larger fraction engages in free riding.
These differences in leaders’ and followers’ behavior between frames have straight-
forward consequences in terms of social efficiency. While the average pool size is
40.67 tokens under the positive frame, on average only 23.83 tokens remain in the
1Entitlement is induced by choosing the leader based on his or her performance in a general-
knowledge quiz.
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common pool under the negative frame.
The findings of our paper inform the growing literature on the effectiveness of
leadership in social dilemmas (e.g., Gächter & Renner 2004, Güth et al. 2007, Levati
et al. 2007, Potters et al. 2007, Haigner & Wakolbinger 2010, Rivas & Sutter 2011).
So far, this strand of literature has established an unambiguously positive effect of
leading by example only if leadership is endogenous. Our paper also adds to the
literature on framing effects in social dilemmas which so far has produced mixed
evidence. While some papers report higher total contributions under the negative
frame (e.g., Brewer & Kramer 1986, Sell & Son 1997, Sell et al. 2002, Dufwenberg
et al. 2011), other papers find a framing effect in the opposite direction (e.g., Andreoni
1995, Willinger & Ziegelmeyer 1999, Park 2000). We enrich this discussion on framing
effects by studying them under a sequential setting. Closest to our work is Cox et al.
(2013). However, our sequential framework consists of a first-moving leader and
second-moving followers, whereas Cox et al. (2013) implement the reverse move order.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge we are the first to introduce a strategy-method
approach in such a framework to exactly measure followers’ reactions to leaders’
decisions and to cleanly compare these reactions between institutional frames.
The data from our experiment suggest that, at least in our setup, individual
cooperation types seem to be malleable. In this regard, our results are in line with
Blanco et al. (2011). They find that social preferences, specifically inequality aver-
sion, are not stable across different games. If the malleability of cooperation types
translates into other setups as well, it might be of general interest for the literature
measuring social preferences (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001, Fischbacher & Gächter
2010, who also use a strategy method to identify cooperation types in social dilem-
mas). Moreover, it might be of relevance for many papers that measure cooperation
preferences in one game and use them as a predictor in their main experiment -
in particular those papers where subjects’ interpretation of the frame potentially
changes between games. Under these circumstances, any interpretation should be
taken with caution, which builds on the observation that elicited types do not predict
behavior in the main experiment because this could just be driven by a change in
types between the two situations.
From a policy perspective, our results are telling as well. Assuming that the lab
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evidence translates to the field (see Rustagi et al. 2010), our results underline that
leaders can potentially affect followers’ behavior and mitigate social dilemmas. At
the same time, our findings show that the example provided by the leader must be
desirable.2 Finally, in particular when a leadership mechanism is in place, (social
efficiency-oriented) policy makers might want to set the institutional frame such that
it addresses the positive aspects (do something good, give something, contribute)
rather than focuses on the negative aspects of behavior (do not do something bad,
do not withhold something, do not withdraw).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe
our experimental design. In Section 3.3 we present the results of the experiment,
and in Section 3.4 we discuss these results and conclude.
3.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment features a social dilemma that is played as a one-shot game. Each
of n = 4 players has to choose how to allocate a given amount of tokens between
a ‘private’ and a ‘public’ account (group account). Each token allocated to the
public account yields a marginal per capita return of α = 0.4, i.e., the sum of
tokens allocated to the public account is multiplied by 1.6 before being distributed
equally among all four players. Tokens in players’ private accounts increase only the
respective player’s payoff. Given that 1/n < α < 1, players face a social dilemma
because tokens allocated to the group account are socially efficient, while it would
be individually rational for egocentric payoff maximizers to allocate all tokens to the
private account.
We study two frames of the social dilemma, i) a give-some as well as ii) a take-
some public-good game. The frame is manipulated between treatments. The two
treatments, Take and Give, only differ with respect to wording (take or give) and
2In this respect, our work is also connected to papers that study the role of social information
in social dilemmas (e.g. Engel et al. 2011, Shang & Croson 2009, List & Lucking-Reiley 2002, Berg
et al. 1995). These studies show that positive examples can foster cooperation, increase donations,
or promote trusting behavior. At the same time, some of these studies also demonstrate that
negative examples can be detrimental to the problem at hand. Moreover, Baumeister et al. (2001)
stress that, in general, bad information is processed more thoroughly than good information and
suggest that “bad is stronger than good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological
phenomena” (p. 323).
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to the initial token allocation. In treatment Give, each player is endowed with
E = 20 tokens in the private account, while the group account is initially empty.
By contrast, players in treatment Take do not have any endowment in their private
accounts (E = 0), but the group account initially consists of nE = 4 ·20 = 80 tokens.
Subjects in Give have to decide how many tokens they want to contribute to the
public account, whereas subjects in Take have to decide how many tokens they
want to withdraw from the public account. Importantly, each subject’s action space
is identical in both treatments, i.e., up to 20 tokens can be contributed to the public
account in Give and be withdrawn from the public account in Take, respectively.
Correspondingly, each subject’s payoff space is identical between treatments. In both
treatments, subject i’s payoff pii is given by
pii = tokens in i’s private account + 0.4· tokens in i’s group account.
In order to reflect the difference in initial endowments between both treatments,
subject i’s payoff in Give and Take can be rewritten as:









with gi and ti being the number of tokens subject i contributes to the public account
or withdraws from it, respectively.
Given that we are interested in leadership effectiveness, the game is implemented
in a sequential move order. Instead of having all group members take their deci-
sion simultaneously, one group member, which we refer to as the leader, decides
about her allocation before the others (followers) do.3 Followers’ responses to the
leader decision are elicited using the strategy method (Selten 1967), i.e., for each
of the 21 possible contributions or requests of the leader, followers have to indi-
cate how many tokens they want to contribute to the public account or withdraw
from it, respectively. Only after all followers have submitted a complete strategy
3The group leader is determined based on subjects’ performance in a general-knowledge quiz
taking place before the actual experiment. The quiz consists of 20 multiple-choice questions. When
answering these questions, subjects know that another part of the experiment will follow, but they
do not know about the game that will be played in this second part. The role of the leader is
assigned to the best performing subject in each group.
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profile, the leader’s actual decision is revealed and followers’ decisions are imple-
mented accordingly. This approach renders followers’ decisions directly comparable
between treatments, irrespective of potential differences in leaders’ choices between
Give and Take. It also allows to study changes in followers’ behavior at the indi-
vidual level by classifying each follower according to his individual contribution or
withdrawal profile, respectively.
The Nash-equilibrium predictions for self-centered agents who maximize their
own monetary payoff are identical in both frames: all subjects free-ride, i.e., allo-
cate the maximum amount of 20 tokens to their private account, although it would
be socially efficient to allocate all tokens to the public account. This implies that
subjects’ behavior is predicted to coincide in Give and Take. The same is, ceteris
paribus, also true under any outcome-based model of social preferences (e.g. Fehr &
Schmidt 1999). To hypothesize differences in behavior between Give and Take, one
would need, for example, i) a change in beliefs about others’ types in an outcome-
oriented model, or ii) a change in beliefs about social norms or prescriptions in a
norm-based or identity-based model (e.g. Akerlof & Kranton 2000), or iii) a change
in the reference point in models of reciprocity (e.g. Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004,
Falk & Fischbacher 2006). In fact, previous results from papers studying differences
in behavior between give- and take-frames in social dilemmas with a simultaneous
move structure suggest that individuals perceive the frames differently and react
with substantially different contribution and withdrawal decisions (e.g. Brewer &
Kramer 1986, Andreoni 1995, Sell & Son 1997, Willinger & Ziegelmeyer 1999, Park
2000, Dufwenberg et al. 2011). Yet, ex ante it is an open question if (and if so,
how) these findings translate into our sequential-move game, because previous work
on leading-by-example suggests that behavior under sequential moves differs from
behavior under simultaneous-move games - in particular since the leadership insti-
tution frequently helps to mitigate social dilemmas (yet these social dilemmas are
usually framed as give-some games; e.g., Gächter & Renner 2004, Potters et al. 2007,
Normann & Rau 2011, Drouvelis & Nosenzo 2013).
Procedures
The study was conducted in July 2013 at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics
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at the University of Bonn (BonnEconLab), using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) for the
experiment and ORSEE (Greiner 2004) for the recruitment. We randomly recruited
from the entire subject pool at the BonnEconLab, which at that time consisted of
about 6300 subjects, most of them undergraduate students of all majors from the
University of Bonn. In total, we invited 96 subjects and assigned them randomly to
treatment Give or Take. Each subject participated in only one treatment, leaving
us with 12 leaders and 36 followers per treatment.
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to private cubicles
and received written instructions, which were also read out aloud to the subjects to
create common knowledge about the game being played.4 In order to check whether
participants had understood the game structure, in particular the consequences of
own and group members’ contributions to (respectively withdrawals from) the public
account, they had to answer a set of control questions. Only after having solved
these questions correctly, subjects could proceed with the experiment. Throughout
the study, interaction was anonymous and subjects did not learn about the identity
of other participants they were interacting with. The experiment ended with a short
questionnaire. Afterwards, subjects received feedback about the outcomes of the
experiment and were then paid in private. Tokens earned in the experiment were
converted at a rate of 1 Token = e0.2. Including the show-up fee of e4, subjects
earned on average e8.97. Each session lasted no more than 50 minutes.
3.3 Results
We focus on followers’ decisions first and compare them between treatments. As
will be seen, followers’ behavior differs significantly between the institutional frames,
both on average and at the individual level. This difference seems to be anticipated
by the leaders, as the subsequent analysis of leaders’ decisions shows. Afterwards, we
derive the implications for efficiency and players’ realized payoffs. The result section
concludes with suggestive evidence, based on data from the ex-post questionnaire,
on the causes of the change in behavior.
Please note that for treatment comparisons to be easy to understand, we report
4Instructions and screenshots can be found in Appendix C.2.
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subjects’ decisions in both frames in terms of contributions, i.e., the withdrawal of
ti tokens from the public account in treatment Take corresponds to a contribution
of gi = 20 − ti tokens. Also note that, since followers made their decision before
they were informed about the leader’s actual decision, we can treat every leader
and every follower as an independent observation. This leaves us with 12 decisions
of leaders and 36 contribution plans of followers in each of the two treatments,
for a total of 24 observations for leaders and 72 observations for followers (respec-
tively 72 · 21 = 1512 data points when taking into account that followers make their
decision contingent on each of the leader’s 21 possible allocations). Finally, recall
that subjects were randomly assigned to treatments. Behavioral differences between
treatments should therefore primarily be driven by the difference in frames.
3.3.1 Followers’ Behavior
Followers’ decisions were elicited using the strategy method.5 For each possible
contribution decision of the leader, Figure 3.1 shows the corresponding contribution
of the followers, averaged over all followers in the respective treatment.
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First, in both treatments we see that leaders’ contributions affect followers’ deci-
sions. There is a significantly positive correlation between leaders’ and followers’
5The contribution plans of each individual subject can be found in Appendix C.1.
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contributions in both treatments. If we take the average contribution of followers
for each given decision of the leader, we get Spearman’s ρ = 0.991 in Take and
ρ = 1.0 in Give, both with p ≤ 0.001.6 Second, the average contribution plans
differ between treatments. For low contributions of the leader, followers in Take
contribute more than followers in Give, and vice versa for high contributions of the
leader.
This difference can also be seen in the following regression model:
cfi = β0 + β1cl + β2TAKE + β3cl × TAKE + i , (3.2)
where cf is the contribution made by followers, cl the contribution of the leader,
“Take” the treatment dummy which takes the value of 1 in Take and 0 in Give,
and “cl × Take” captures the interaction effects between leader’s contribution and
treatment. Table 3.1 lists the corresponding estimates. Estimates in Column (1) and
Column (2) are based on the entire sample, with the difference being that additional
covariates (gender, age, self-reported measures of risk and trust) are included in
Column (2) to check for the robustness of the results. As we already observed in
Figure 3.1, higher leader contributions induce higher follower contributions in both
treatments, but slope and intercept of the contribution profiles differ. The coefficient
of cl is significant and positive, 0.534 in Give and (0.534− 0.230 =) 0.304 in Take.
The difference in slopes of -0.230 is significant, but the coefficient of the treatment
dummy “Take” just falls short of being significant (p = 0.117).
Result 1. Followers’ contributions react to the leader’s contribution in both frames,
although the average contribution profile differs between the give- and take-frame.
The next question is why we observe the difference in the average contribution
profile. One possibility is that all subjects react less strongly to the leader’s decision
in Take, but the individual data tell a different story. Having access to a complete
contribution plan of every follower, we can use a type classification similar to the
one introduced in Fischbacher et al. (2001) to discriminate between i) subjects who
6This conservative calculation is based on 21 observations per treatment. If we use each fol-
lower’s actual contribution instead of the average contribution over all followers, we get Spearman’s
ρ = 0.200 in Take and ρ = 0.458 in Give, both with p ≤ 0.001 but now based on 756 observations
per treatment.
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Take 2.360 2.516 −0.706
(1.462) (1.606) (1.306)










Constant 1.539∗ 1.870 0.761
(0.807) (3.998) (1.518)
Observations 1512 1512 735
Subjects 72 72 35
Sample full full cond. coop.
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates from a random-effects model (standard errors are
given in parentheses and corrected for clustering on the level of each individual). The dependent
variable is the amount contributed by the follower for any possible contribution “cl” of the
leader. The variable “Take” is a dummy variable indicating treatment Take. “cl × Take”
is the corresponding interaction between leader contribution and treatment. “Gender” is 1 for
male and 0 for female. “Risk” and “Trust” are self-reported measures elicited in the ex-post
questionnaire, both ranging between 0 (low trust/risk averse) and 10 (high trust/risk seeking).
Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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free-ride on the leader’s contributions, ii) subjects who conditionally cooperate with
respect to the leader’s contributions, and iii) other subjects that do not fall into the
previous categories. More precisely, we use the following classification strategy:
i) free riders: subjects who contribute exactly zero for all 21 possible contributions
of the leader.
ii) conditional cooperators: subjects with a positive Spearman correlation coef-
ficient ρci,cl > 0 between own contributions and leader’s contributions that
reaches a level of significance of p ≤ 0.01.
iii) others: subjects who are neither free-riders nor conditional cooperators.
Table 3.2: Distribution of cooperation types
Type Give Take
free-riders 14% 36%
conditional cooperators 67% 31%
others 19% 33%
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of types between treatments. Strikingly, we
observe strong treatment differences (Pearson χ2 test, p = 0.008). In treatment
Give, the number of subjects being categorized as conditional cooperators is more
than twice as high as in Take (24 vs. 11 subjects). At the same time, only about
half as many subjects are categorized as free-riders in Give than in Take (5 vs. 13),
the same being true for the number of subjects classified as ‘others’ (7 vs. 12).7
Considering that the treatments are randomly assigned to the subjects, one should
expect to see roughly the same distribution of types in both treatments. Instead, it
seems that in particular cooperative types are not stable but are prone to changes
in the institutional frame.8
Result 2. Cooperation types seem to be malleable, since the distribution of types
differs significantly between the take- and the give-frame.
7In total, 26.4% of followers are categorized as ‘others’. Within this classification type, there is
a large heterogeneity in contribution patterns, e.g., some subjects contribute a positive but constant
amount for all decisions of the leader, while some subjects show more ‘random’ patterns.
8Below, we will present further evidence stressing the interpretation that the change in distri-
bution is indeed of systematic nature rather than just being a randomization failure.
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When we compare the behavior of subjects within a given cooperation category,
by definition we do not observe differences for free-riders (they always contribute
nothing). We also do not observe significant differences for ‘others’.9 However, as
Figure 3.2 shows, we do find significant effects for conditional cooperators. Con-
ditional cooperators in treatment Take frequently match leaders’ contributions or
even surpass them, while they stay below leaders’ contributions in Give. This can
also be seen in Column (3) of Table 3.1, where we re-run the regression of followers’
contributions on the leader’s contributions, but restricted to the sample of conditional
cooperators. The coefficient of “cl × Take” is positive and significant, implying that
the average contribution plan of conditional cooperators has a statistically higher
slope in Take compared to Give (1.04 instead of 0.8 per token contributed by the
leader).
Result 3. For conditional cooperators, the positive impact of leaders’ contributions
on followers’ contributions is significantly more pronounced in the take- than in the
give-frame.
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9Interestingly, there is a slight tendency that more subjects always (i.e., for any of the 21
leader allocations) contribute the full amount in Take than in Give, i.e., there are more subjects
that never take anything from the public account than there are subjects who always contribute
everything.
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To wrap up, with respect to contributions the take-some frame has a positive
effect on those followers who condition their behavior on the leader’s decision - but at
the same time the probability for being such a conditional cooperator is reduced un-
der the take-frame. At least in our sample, the latter effect dominates. Thus, the
marginal effect of an additional token contributed by the leader is on average smaller
in Take than in Give. Interestingly, as we will show next, leaders seem to anticipate
the difference in followers’ behavior and contribute less themselves in Take.
3.3.2 Leaders’ Behavior
Leaders in treatment Give contribute more than double the amount of leaders’
contributions in treatment Take. They contribute on average 12.67 tokens in Give
and only 6.17 tokens in Take, the difference being significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p = 0.026). As Figure 3.3 shows, the difference in means is due to a significant
difference in the distributions between Give and Take (Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact
test, p = 0.092). While in Take one third of the leaders contribute nothing at all,
in Give all leaders contribute a positive amount and one third even contribute the
maximum amount.
Result 4. Leaders’ contributions differ strongly between the take- and the give-frame.
























If we apply leaders’ actual decision to followers’ contribution plans to derive the
actual realizations of contributions and payoffs, we see an interesting effect. First,
the sum of contributions to the public account is almost 50% lower in Take than
in Give (23.8 vs. 40.6 tokens, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.126), which implies
that the leadership institution is much less efficient in a take-some frame than in
a give-some frame. At the same time, however, the distribution of final payoffs
within the population is more equal in Take than in Give (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
exact test, p = 0.094). The reason is that leaders are ‘exploited’ in Give, as they
contribute on average 12.67 tokens and followers only 9.33 tokens - so they earn less
than the followers (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.078). By contrast, in treatment
Take leaders seem to anticipate the high free-riding potential of followers. Leaders’
contributions (6.17) are now lower but very closely matched by the followers (5.88),
implying almost equal payoffs for leaders and followers (Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
p = 0.877).
Result 5. The leadership institution is less efficient in the take- than in the give-
frame, but can result in more equitable payoffs.
3.3.3 Potential Explanations for the Differences in Behavior
The differences in leadership behavior between treatments might potentially be ex-
plained by leaders’ perception of the situation. In the ex-post questionnaire, we asked
the leaders how responsible they felt for their group (on an 11-point Likert scale).
We find that leaders in Give feel significantly more responsible for their group than
leaders in Take (6.25 vs. 4.08, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.036). We also asked
leaders about different aspects that might have been of importance for their decision,
and observe that leaders in Take state having cared significantly less about others’
trustworthiness (8.25 vs. 5.66, Wilcoxon rank-sum test p = 0.009) and about fairness
considerations (6.42 vs. 4.50, Wilcoxon rank-sum test p = 0.096) than in treatment
Give. These observations suggest that leaders perceive the two frames differently,
as the focus in the take-frame seems to shift away from social aspects like fairness,
trust and responsibility.
For followers we do not observe significant differences in responses to the ex-
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Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates from a linear regression
model (standard errors are given in parentheses). The dependent vari-
able is the self-reported level of trust in strangers. The variable “Take” is
a dummy variable indicating treatment Take. “FR” is a dummy variable
which is 1 for free-riders and 0 for conditional cooperators. “FR × Take”
is the corresponding interaction between type and treatment. Signifi-
cance levels are denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
post questionnaire. However, we do observe that the impact of trust seems to differ
between treatments. In the ex-post questionnaire, we asked subjects to which degree
they trust strangers (ranging from 0 ‘do not trust at all’ to 10 ‘fully trust’). The
regressions in Table 3.1 above include this measure of ‘trust’ as a control variable.
The coefficient of trust is significant and positive in the full sample (Column (2)), but
almost zero in the restricted sample that only includes the conditional cooperators
(Column (3)). This suggests that there might be a threshold level of trust from which
on a subject starts contributing by becoming a conditional cooperator, and once this
threshold is reached there are no additional effects of trust on contribution behavior.
The regression reported in Table 3.3 indicates that, if such a trust-threshold really
exists, it seems to be lower in the give-frame than in the take-frame. Among the group
of free-riders and conditional cooperators, trust levels in Take are not per se different
from trust levels in Give (the coefficient of “Take” is -0.7235 with p = 0.404). Yet,
the amount of trust is significantly lower among free-riders than among conditional
cooperators (the coefficient of “FR” is -3.342 with p = 0.006). The difference is less
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pronounced in Take than in Give since the average level of trust among free-riders
increases (the coefficient of “FR × Take” is 2.216 with p = 0.149). This suggests
that in treatment Give, the group of free-riders mainly consists of individuals with
low levels of trust, while in treatment Take, also persons with relatively high levels
of trust occasionally end up as a free-rider.
3.4 Discussion
We studied the influence of positive and negative frames on leadership effectiveness
in social dilemmas. Using lab experiments, we found significant differences in coope-
ration rates between the institutional frames for leaders and followers. Moreover, we
implemented a strategy method to elicit followers’ entire contribution plan contingent
on the leader’s decisions. The data at the individual level revealed that cooperation
types were not stable between institutional frames, because the observed type distri-
bution differed significantly between the take- and the give-frame. Specifically, the
number of free-riders more than doubled and the number of conditional cooperators
was almost reduced by half when comparing the take- to the give-frame. Based on
self-reported measures that were elicited in an ex-post questionnaire, we provided
indicative evidence that the change in cooperation behavior might have been due
to i) differences in the perception of give- and take-frames, and ii) differences in
the degree to which subjects needed to trust other group members in order to start
cooperating.
Leading-by-example, or more general a sequential move structure, has been fre-
quently promoted in recent years as a potential solution to social dilemmas. Yet, the
corresponding evidence almost exclusively stems from experiments that use games
with a voluntary contribution mechanism. Our experiment supports the previous
findings, since we also observe high levels of social efficiency in the presence of leaders
- but only in the give-some frame. If the institutional frame is more like in the case of
a common-pool resource (take-some frame), cooperation rates are reduced by almost
50%.
Part of this loss in efficiency is due to a significant reduction in leaders’ willingness
to cooperate. Leaders set a much better example in the give- than in the take-frame.
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One could think that, as soon as we find a way to increase leaders’ contributions in
the take-frame, the problem would be alleviated. However, we can observe this coun-
terfactual because of the strategy-method data on followers’ behavior, and prospects
look bleak. We see that the marginal impact of leaders’ contribution on followers’
average contribution is significantly smaller in the take-frame than in the give-frame.
Even worse, we observe that a substantial fraction of subjects seem to change their
cooperation type altogether, i.e., behaving like a free-rider rather than like a condi-
tional cooperator.
The malleability of cooperation types is striking. Assuming that types are also
not stable across frames in other games (which remains to be shown), it implies that
one should be cautious in comparing aggregate data between games, in particular
when (subjects’ interpretation of) the frame changes between games.10 It also creates
an additional difficulty for testing the empirical relevance of a behavioral theory,
in particular when using data from different kinds of games. To overcome such
problems, one would need to know why (or which) people react to the different
frames, so that these relevant factors could be controlled for.
In this respect, our data contains some indicative evidence why cooperation beha-
vior changes between frames. In particular, we observed that subjects reported that
different aspects were of importance for their decision. We also observed that trust
affected people differently in the two frames. However, a word of caution should
be in place here. The potential reasons listed here that might explain a change
in behavior between frames are based on self-reported measures that were elicited
after the experiment. Subjects had already experienced the situation and made their
decisions (although they did not receive information about the outcome of the game
yet), so that a causal interpretation is not straightforward. The differences in the
self-reported measures might as well be caused by the differences in subjects’ deci-
sions between the frames. Future studies should elicit potentially relevant measures
10For example, imagine that the cooperation type would be elicited in a positively-framed game
(e.g., giving in a dictator game, contributing in a public-good game) and the main experiment
under study is set in a negative frame (e.g., sabotage in tournaments, stealing game, market game
with collusion). It might then be the case that the cooperation types as elicited in the first game
do not predict behavior in the main experiment. One might jump to the conclusion that motives
of cooperation are not of importance in the main experiment. But maybe they are, and one just
did not observe it because too many people reacted to the difference in frames and changed their
cooperation type between the two games.
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ex-ante, before subjects make their decisions and before information about others’
behavior and outcomes is resolved. Another thing that should be controlled for in
future studies are beliefs about others’ decisions, in particular when the type classifi-
cation is based on a strategy method that focuses only on a subset of others’ decisions
(in our case on the leader’s decisions, but not on the other followers’ decisions).11
In repeated games, doing so will also allow for a clearer interpretation of changes
in cooperation types over time. In fact, it would be really interesting to learn more
about the long-run effects; in particular to see if cooperation types are stable within
a given frame, and to see if experience in one frame affects the perception of the
situation (and thus the cooperation types) in other institutional frames or environ-
ments or decision situations (e.g., in the absence of a leader, or in the presence of a
punishment mechanism).
Finally, from a policy perspective our results might also be understood as a
chance. (Not only) in environments where leading-by-example can be implemented
or already is in place, shifting people’s attention to the positive aspects of the situ-
ation might increase social efficiency. This could be done by addressing people with
regard to increasing cooperation rather than reducing free-riding, respectively. For
instance, one could try telling people to start behaving in a ‘desired’ way instead
of communicating that we need to stop behaving in an ‘undesired’ way. A concrete
example might be environmental protection: instead of communicating that we are in
a situation where there is too much pollution and everyone should reduce pollution,
one should rather focus on the ways to reduce pollution and advise people to in-
vest money/effort into these means (e.g., reducing power consumption vs. increasing
energy efficiency; or stop using non-renewable resources vs. start using renewable
resources; etc.). Whether this indeed works is, of course, ultimately an empirical
question. To shed light on this question, further lab experiments are telling, but we
should also carry on Elinor Ostrom’s work and collect more field evidence to gain an
even better understanding of the mechanisms that drive human behavior in social
dilemmas.
11Here we elicit contributions contingent only on the leader’s decisions. While followers cannot
contingent their decisions on the actions of the other followers, this allows for a clear focus on the
leader-follower relationship. It is possible, however, that part of the change in followers’ contribution
plans is because the frames change their beliefs about the contribution plans of the other followers;
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The original instructions in German are available from the authors upon request.
Below is the English translation of the instructions used in treatment Give. Diffe-
rences in the instructions in treatment Take are marked by square brackets “[...]”.
General information
You are participating in a study on economic decision-making. If you read the fol-
lowing explanations carefully, you can earn a substantial amount of money. It is
therefore very important that you read these explanations carefully and understand
them.
During the study no communication of any kind is allowed. If you have any questions,
please indicate it and raise your hand. We will come to you and answer your question
in private, so that the other participants will not be disturbed.
The study consists of exactly two parts. Information on the second part will be
handed out to you after you have completed part one. The first part features a quiz.
The quiz consists of 20 multiple-choice questions with four given answers each, of
which one is the correct solution. Please indicate for each question the answer that
you think is correct.
Please confirm each of your answers by clicking “OK” in order to proceed to the
next question. As soon as all participants have completed the quiz in part one of the
study, you receive the instructions for part two.
Do you have any questions?
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Information on part two of the study
In part two, all monetary amounts are presented in Taler. At the end of the study,
the Taler you have earned will be converted into Euro and paid out to you. The
conversion rate is 1 Taler = e0.2. In addition to the earnings from part two, every
participant receives a show-up fee of e4.
At the beginning of the study, all participants are randomly matched into groups of
four. Accordingly, except for yourself, three other participants belong to your group.
Every participant has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of Taler between
two different accounts. The first account is a private account. The second account
is a public account (group account) for all group members. A participant’s payoff at
the end of the study is composed of these two accounts, i.e.:
your payoff = 1 * Taler in your private account
+ 0.4 * Taler in the group’s public account
Initially, there are 0 [80] Taler in the public account of your group (group account)
and 20 [0] Taler in your private account. Each participant has to decide how many
Taler she wants to contribute to [withdraw for himself from] the group account. Ev-
ery participant can contribute [withdraw] an integer amount between 0 and 20 Taler
to [from] the group account.
Every Taler that you do not contribute to the group account remains on your private
account. [Every Taler that you withdraw from the group account is put into your
private account.] After all participants have made their decisions, the Taler in your
group account are multiplied by the factor 1.6 and distributed equally among all four
group members. Your payoff from the group account thus increases [decreases] by
0.4 Taler for each Taler that you contribute to [withdraw from] the group account.
At the same time, also the payoffs of the three other members of your group increase
[decrease] by 0.4 Taler, because they receive payoffs from the group account as well.
Participants make their decisions sequentially. In each group, one participant is
the first to decide. This is the participant who, out of all four group members, has
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answered the most quiz questions correctly. Before this participant’s decision is re-
vealed to the other three group members, these latter have to decide for each of the
21 possible contribution [withdrawal] decisions how many Taler they want to contri-
bute to [withdraw from] the group account themselves. Of course, when you make
the 21 decisions, you do not know which one will become relevant. Therefore, you
should consider each decision carefully. Only after all participants have entered their
decisions, the contribution [withdrawal] decision of the first participant is revealed.
This decision and the decisions of the three other group members for this situation
finally determine the participants’ payoffs.
To further familiarize you with the procedure, the decision screens are presented
below. Moreover, in a few seconds some additional control questions will appear on
your screen. Afterwards, the second part of this study begins. After finishing the
second part, we will ask you to fill out a short questionnaire. This questionnaire
constitutes the final part of today’s study. Afterwards you will be informed about
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